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ABSTRACT

LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION IN
NEW ENGLAND:

EMPIRICAL AND CASE STUDIES

by
ROBERT NEIL HORN
This dissertation focuses on factors which may contribute to labor
market segmentation in New England.

Segmentation or dual labor market

theorists divide the labor market into primary and secondary sectors,
claiming the nature of occupations within the separate markets differs
with respect to the organization of work, remuneration, locus of control
and room for promotional opportunity.

Employment conditions in the

secondary labor market are characterized by low pay, high turnover,
minimal skill requirements, arbitrary managerial control and little or
no room for in-firm upward mobility.

Primary labor market occupations,

on the other hand, are characterized by higher pay, greater employment
stability and the existence of internal labor markets.

Central to the

dualists' interpretation of the labor market is the hypothesis that the
sector in which a worker begins employment is the sector in which he will
remain throughout his entire working career.
The above hypotheses are tested in two ways.

First, using data from

the 1970 Census Public Use Sample, I have constructed a set of econometric
models which analyze (a) the process of wage determination in the primary
and secondary labor market, (b) the conditional probability of primary
market employment, and (c) the likelihood of upward (secondary to primary)
vii

mobility.

The empirical results of each of the models are interpreted

in terms of their consistency with the basic postulates of dual labor
market theory as well as neoclassical human capital theory.
The second part of the thesis consists of a case study of the
structure of the labor market in Manchester, New Hampshire, the state’s
largest and most industrious city.

By means of open ended interviews

with white collar and blue collar workers and managerial personnel, the
existence of labor market duality in Manchester is directly examined.
Employee and management responses are also used to determine the struc
ture of internal labor markets which, according to dual theory, provide
institutionally determined avenues of upward mobility, seniority clauses
and pay scales for workers in primary occupations.

By combining econo

metric models with a case study, this dissertation provides a clearer
description of the functioning of labor markets than most of the earlier
research, which has tended to rely exclusively on empirical model
building.
The dissertation also includes an extensive review of the recent
literature on labor market segmentation.

Particular emphasis is placed

on employment conditions in secondary markets and the contributions of
radical economists to the study of labor markets.

In a separate chapter

several earlier empirical studies of labor market duality are reviewed
and critiqued.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, economists have shown Increasing concern over the
plight of large numbers of the labor force who appear to be confined to
low wage labor markets.

The apparent failure of government manpower

programs to reduce the burdens of economic inequality in the labor mar
ket has prompted some economists to advocate policies aimed directly at
the structure of labor markets.

This represents a marked change from

traditional analysis, which stresses increasing education and vocational
training programs, i.e., supply side factors, as the means by which dis
advantaged workers would be able to gain access to better paying jobs.
Advocates of this change in public policy argue that workers in low
wage labor markets do have the ability to perform in higher wage sectors,
but market imperfections, discrimination, and other institutional con
straints function as barriers, severely limiting their access to the
better jobs.

Policies suggested to alleviate the burdens of disadvan

taged workers include stronger emphasis on antidiscriminatory legisla
tion to curb racial imbalance in primary labor markets, programs to
stabilize secondary market employment relations, making them more
primary-like, and increased use of federal government employment
creating programs.
In this dissertation, I examine some factors which may contribute
to, or result from, the segmentation of labor markets.
divided into three main sections.

The thesis is

In Chapters II and III, I present a

detailed review of the conceptual literature on the segmentation of

labor markets, and several empirical attempts to determine the existence
of labor market duality.

The literature review begins with a brief

discussion of the history of the theory of non-competing groups (John S.
Mill and J. Cairnes) and progresses to the work of the institutionalists
during the 1950's and the studies of ghetto labor markets during the
early 1960's, out of which dual theory developed.

I then turn my atten

tion to a thorough discussion of employment conditions and industrial
organization in secondary and primary labor markets.

The chapter con

cludes with a summary of radical contributions to labor market theory
and public policy implications derived from a dualist approach to labor
markets.
In the Empirical Studies Review Chapter, I look at four researchers'
attempts to devise econometric models to depict the incidence of seg
mented labor markets.

Special attention is given to the methods used

to determine which jobs are classified as primary or secondary.
models are divided into three sections:
(2)

(1)

wage determination,

probability of primary market employment, and (3)

secondary to primary mobility.

The

likelihood of

Within each section, the results of the

models are analyzed and criticized in terms of their specification and
consistency with the basic postulates of dual labor market theory.
The second section of the thesis consists of the development of
a set of linear regression models to determine the extent of segmenta
tion in New England labor markets.

In Chapter IV, three empirical

models, corresponding to the sections cited in the previous paragraph,
are specified.

Each of the variables appearing in the equations is

discussed in terms of its expected sign and significance according to
dual market theory.
In Chapter V, I present the results of testing the models developed

3

in Chapter IV using a data base consisting of the 1970 Census Public
Use Sample for the five New England states.

The regression coefficients

are carefully scrutinized in order to determine the efficacy of the
dualist approach to the study of labor markets.

The results are also

used to compare the dual approach with the paradigm still adhered to by
most mainstream economists:

the queue theory.

The third part of the thesis consists of a case study of labor
market conditions in Manchester, New Hampshire.

By means of interviews

with production level workers and managerial personnel in several of the
city's largest footwear, textile, and electronics industries, I try to
determine whether or not labor market segmentation is suggested by the
operation of the labor market from which these industries draw their
manpower needs, and the relations of production within the firms.

I also

document the extent to which internal labor markets serve to institu
tionalize job progression mechanisms in each of the plants visited.
Although the case study approach has not been as widely used in
economics as in the other social sciences, I argue that it is a viable
way to acquire detailed information about local industrial and labor
market characteristics.

In fact, my conclusions suggest that advocates

of dual market theory should place increasing emphasis on case studies
of local labor markets, so as to develop a data base comprehensive
enough to take account of both supply side and demand side conditions in
future empirical studies.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Dual labor market theory had what might be called its preorigins
in the writings of several economists of the classical school.

John S.

Mill recognized that the range of occupations available to a worker
depended upon the socio-economic status of his father.

Mill wrote:

The liberal professions are mostly supplied by the
sons of either the professional or the idle classes:
the more highly skilled manual employments are filled
up from the sons of skilled artisans, or the class
of tradesmen who rank with them: the lower classes
of employment are in a similar case: and unskilled
labourers, with few exceptions, rjmain from father to
son in their prestine condition.
Although Mill acknowledged the remote possibility of interclass mobility,
he stated that there is a "hereditary distinction of caste" between
different grades of labor, and criticized earlier political economists
for failing to take account of such distinctions.

2

The strongest statements concerning occupational stratification
among the working classes can be found in the writings of J.E. Cairnes.
Cairnes, after undertaking an extensive study of the process by which
workers find employment, concluded that
What we find...is not a whole population competing
indiscriminately for all occupations, but a series
of industrial layers...within each of which the
various candidates for employment possess...power

'''John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, edited by
Sir W. J. Ashley (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, Bookseller, 1871), p.393.
2

M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, (Illinois:
Irwin, Inc. 1962), p.176.

4

Richard C.

5

of selection while those occupying the several strata
are, for all purposes of effective competition,
practically isolated from each other.^
Cairnes was also credited with developing the theory of noncompeting
groups, as the following much quoted passage illustrates:
...the average workman, from whatever rank he be taken,
finds his power of competition limited to a certain
range of occupations...We are thus compelled to recog
nize the existence of noncompeting industrial groups
as a feature of our social economy.^
With the rise of marginalism in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, and its concommitant shift away from the study of social
classes towards individual maximizing behavior, the theory of noncom
peting groups was cast a s i d e . I t was not until the middle of the pre
sent century that the theory was revitalized by the institutionalist
school, spearheaded by Clark Kerr’s work on institutional and structure
less labor markets.
Kerr described the dimensions of institutional markets as being
set by formal and informal rules, not by the individual preferences of
employers and employees as competitive theory would dictate.

Accor

ding to Kerr:
institutional rules in the labor market...establish
boundaries between labor markets and make them more
specific and harder to cross. They define the
points of competition, the groups which may compete,
and the grounds on which they compete.^
3

J.E. Cairnes, Political Economy, (New York:
Publishers 1874), p.68.
4
Ibid.

Harper and Brother,

^See M. Dobb Theories of Value and Distribution ch.7, for a discus
sion of the change in the subject matter of economists during the
Marginal Revolution.
£
Clark Kerr, "The Balkanization of Labor Markets" in Labor Mobility
and Economic Opportunity, ed. E. Wright Bakke, et.al. (New York: Tech
nology Press of M.I.T. and John Wiley 1954), p.93.
7Ibid. p.109.

6

This internally structured type of labor market is contrasted with
what Kerr and Lloyd Fisher labeled the "structureless market".

The

latter is said to possess the following characteristics:
(1) No unions with seniority or other rules,
(2) the relation between the employee and employer is
a transitory, impersonal one,
(3) the workers are unskilled,
(4) payment is by unit of product, and
(5) little or no machinery is employed.®
I will show that the distinction between institutional and structureless
labor markets formed the basis for the dualist dichotomization of the
labor market into primary and secondary sectors.

Kerr's description

of the mechanisms which govern entry criteria, mobility patterns, wage
determination and the role of unions in institutional markets versus
the "cash nexus" nature of structureless markets provided an important
framework for future labor market analysis.

That the dualists have

adopted this framework is apparent, as there is direct lineage from the
institutional market to the primary labor market and from the structure
less market to the secondary labor market.

What is missing in Kerr's

work is a discussion of socioeconomic factors which result in confine
ment within structureless markets.

Some dualists and, more recently,

radical economists have tried to address this issue.
One final comment on what I have labeled "preorigins" of dual .
labor market analysis concerns the awareness of the institutionalists
that the changing structure of American industry has fostered the
development of internalized job clusters.

Glen Cain pointed out

Dunlop and Kerr view(ed) the growth of large firms
and unions as promoting internal (within-firm) labor

8Ibid. p.95.

7

markets that are only weakly connected to external
(between-firm) labor markets,^
while E. R. Livernash stated, "internal promotion has developed with the
growing diversification and specialization of jobs."^

Radicals,

picking up where the institutionalists left off, have made the dynamics
of the monopolization of capital and its affects on labor markets a
focal point of much of their work in this area.
The Development of Dual Labor Market Analysis
Dual labor theory did not emerge as a continuum in the theoretical
progression of labor market analysis cited above.

According to David

M. Gordon, "dual labor market theory arose out of a series of relatively
informal studies of local labor markets and individual establishments."^
The "informal" nature of these early studies has led some writers to
argue that dual theory "is not really a theory but merely a descriptive
view of the labor market."

12

Nevertheless, a substantial body of

literature has developed in recent years, the immediate origins of which
can be traced to several independent studies of labor market conditions
in inner city areas of New York, Boston and Chicago during the 1960's.
Thus, Michael J. Piore, who along with Peter Doeringer has been the
chief proponent of dual market analysis, describes

its intent as

9

Glen G. Cain, "the Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to
Orthodox Theory: A Survey", Journal of Economic Literature, (Vd. XIV,
No. 4,Dec. 1976, pp.1215-1257), p.1222.
^E. Robert Livernash, "The Internal Wage System" in New Concepts in
Wage Determination, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957, pp.140-172),
p.144.
1;LDavid M. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment, (Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972), p. 43.
12

Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Conse
quences", (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1975),
p.10.

follows:
...dual hypothesis was designed to explain the
problems of disadvantaged, particularly black,
workers in urban areas, which had previously been
attributed to unemployment. It implied that the
basic problem was that they were somehow confined
to jobs within the secondary sector, and the
reported unemployment rates were essentially a
symptom of the instability of the jobs and the
high rate of labor turnover among the labor force
which held them rather than a literal inability
to find work.
The basic postulate of dual or segmented labor market theory is
that there is no single labor market from which employers seek workers
in accordance with the latter's marginal productivity.

Dualists

divide or segment the labor market into two or more distinct labor
markets, claiming the characteristics of the separate markets differ
with respect to the organization of work, remuneration, locus of
control, labor supply, and so forth.

The major distinction found in

the literature is between the secondary labor market and the primary
labor market.
I begin the body of this literature review by giving a detailed
discussion of the secondary labor market, paying close attention to
the relations of production in this sector.

I then discuss the pri

mary labor market and its institutionalized internal structure.

A

discussion of an operational framework for the study of market duality
and its implications for public policy follows.

The chapter concludes

with radical interpretations and extensions of market segmentation
theory.
13
Michael J. Piore, "Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Segmentation"
in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et. al. (Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company 1975), p.126.

9

The Secondary Labor Market
Secondary labor market jobs are characterized by low pay, unstable
employment and poor working conditions, and are said to be in direct
competition with welfare and crime for the attachment of the potential
labor force.

14

Although the latter part of the preceding

statement

may somewhat over estimate the transient nature of the secondary labor
force, workers confined to this sector do face employment opportunities
which tend to promote and even encourage instability.

Remuneration is

often by hourly wage and/or piecework; workers are subject to arbitrary
managerial decision making; and the jobs, once learned, quickly become
mere routines leaving virtually no room for individual autonomy and
growth.

As a result, there appears to be very little reason why any

worker should feel any sense of attachment to any particular secondary
market job.
Piore and Doeringer cite three kinds of employment situations
commonly found within the secondary labor market.

The first of these

is completely unstructured employment.'*''’ This is closest in context to
Fisher's structureless labor market cited above.

Next is what they call

"secondary" internal markets, which do have some amount of internal
structure, but many ports of entry, short mobility clusters and low
paying, unpleasant work.^

Last are secondary jobs attached to the

bottom end of an "internal labor market in which the remainder of jobs
14
Michael J. Piore, "On-the-Job Training in a Dual Labor Market" in
Public-Private Manpower Policies, ed. Arnold R. Weber (Madison, Wise.:
I.R.R.A. pp.101-132, 1969), p.102.
^Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets
and Manpower Analysis, (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co. 1971),
p.167.
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are primary".They are careful to point out that although "attached"
to a primary market job sequence, secondary workers do not have access
to the better paying, higher status jobs hovering just above their heads.
Labor Supply and Industrial Organization
Given Doeringer's and Piore's description of secondary employment
situations, it is important to detail factors which characterize the
supply of labor in secondary labor markets.

Harold Wool points out that

the American economy has had little trouble in meeting its low level
manpower needs.

18

He goes on to note:

Employers experience little difficulty in recruiting
an adequate supply of workers for (secondary labor
market) jobs because of the existence of a large pool
of workers who have few other effective choices.
Included in this pool are disproportionate numbers of
black workers, recent immigrants, and migrants from
farm to city, all sharing more or less the handicap
of limited education, skills and information.^
Karl Marx's concept of the industrial reserve army of the unemployed
is quite relevant to Wool's depiction of the secondary work force.

Marx

saw that the process of capitalist development created a mass of low
skilled, undifferentiated labor power, whose numbers swelled the ranks
of the unemployed.

Because of competition for the existing jobs, their

chief function (to the capitalists) was to depress wages down to sub
sistence levels and prevent the formation of collective agreements by
workers which would result in upward pressure on wage rates.
In addition to fitting into the Marxian perspective, the secondary
labor market also closely approximates the neoclassical model of a

17Ibid.
18
Harold Wool, "Future Labor Supply for Lower Level Occupations" in
Monthly Labor Review, (Vol.99, No. 3, March 1976, pp.22-31), p.26.
1 9 Ibid.

11

competitive market.

Labor power is taken by employers to be a homo

geneous commodity, and firms share many of the traits of Marshall's
representative firm operating under competitive conditions, i.e., small
in relation to the market, little effective control over price, low
profit margins etc.

Barry Bluestone has done considerable work in

describing the characteristics of industries which operate in low wage
sectors of the economy.

His research suggests that low wages do not

result from monopolistic exploitation of labor in order to reap high
profits, but from low profit margins in the bulk of low wage industries.

20

He goes on to point out that, "the small 'invisible' firm...often avoids
the sharp eye of the government inspector and the acute sensitivities
of an aroused public opinion.

Consequently, low wages and poor working

conditions have a much better change of survival in the industries of
the working poor."

21

Given the structure and the minimal training requirements of jobs
in the secondary sector, employers, in making their hiring decisions, act
as if employees have more or less equal productivities.

22

Furthermore,

since the majority of industries operating in this sector are labor
intensive, and since there are minimal internal and external institu
tional constraints, low wages tend to reflect the low marginal produc
tivity of labor.

Wage determination is quite simply left up to imper

sonal market forces.

Minimum wage statutes may be considered a constraint,

although Bluestone notes many low wage groups have been excluded from
20

Barry Bluestone, "The Characteristics of Marginal Industries" in
Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective, (Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath and Co., 1971, pp.102-107), p. 103.
21Ibid.
22

Gordon,

p.105.
p.51.

12

minimum wage legislation.
Wage rates are uniformly low throughout the entire secondary labor
market.

While slight variations in wages may be attributable to market

imperfections, Gordon concludes that:
individual incomes will depend primarily on the
number of hours worked, while variations in
individual hourly earnings will depend very little
on variations in individual "capacities" like
aptitude, reasoning and vocational skills.^
Bluestone provides an important summary of the implications of this tie
between the process of wage determination in the secondary labor market
and competitive theory in the competitive model.

He writes:

It is interesting to note that precisely where the
market approaches its theoretical best-in firms
furthest from monopoly and closest to laissez fairethe market cannot supply jobs adequate enough to
feed a man's family satisfactorily.^

Employment Conditions
Doeringer, Piore, and others have argued that employment instability
is a common feature within the secondary labor market.

26

Turnover rates

are high largely because neither the employer nor the employee has any
vested interest in promoting stable employment relationships.

From the

employer's point of view, the short learning curves common to secondary
jobs and the existence of a large pool of substitute workers renders
turnover inexpensive and not a cause for concern.
23
Bluestone.

From the workers'

p. 195.

"^Gordon, p. 51
25
Bluestone. p. 107.
26
Employment instability is not unique to the secondary market. Also,
workers may remain on their jobs for long periods of time even though the
jobs themselves may encourage instability.
27
Rosenberg, p. 14.

13

perspective, the very nature of the jobs, i.e., low wages, poor working
conditions, seasonality etc., encourages a high rate of turnover.
It is important to realize that turnover within the secondary
market is largely confined to "bouncing around" from one low level job
to another, whereas in primary markets an individual usually leaves his
job for a better one.

Stephan Thernstrom gives an excellent illustra

tion of the type of "mobility" common to secondary market workers.

He

states:
the clerk who becomes a salesman, the menial hospital
employee who becomes a short order cook...these are
men who have not discernably gained (or lost) in the
process of changing jobs. They may have been drawn
into the new post by slightly higher wages...or they
may have been fired...and forced to accept somewhat
lower wages...in order to find work at all. In
either case...(one)...would glassify their movement
as horizontal, not vertical.
Central to the notion of employment instability within the secon
dary sector is the position held by some dualists that unstable jobs
lead to unstable lifestyles, which tend to reinforce behavioral patterns
which are antagonistic to stable employment.

Doeringer asserts that

these patterns are passed on to succeeding generations.

29

As a result,

the conditions which gave rise to secondary labor markets also act to
insure their reproduction and continued existence.

As Glen Cain so

aptly puts it:

28
Stephen Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress
in the American Metropolis 1880-1870, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1973) , p.47 .
29
Peter B. Doeringer and others, Low-Income Labor Markets and Urban
Manpower Programs: A Critical Assessment, (U. S. Department of Labor,
1972), p.9.

14

factors that start workers off in the secondary
sector can shape tastes in an antiwork direction
and thereby reinforce the disadvantaged position
of low wage workers. The (segmentation) model
has an aspect of the "viscious circle" or "selffulfilling prophecy" to it. 30
This position is given further support by Bennett Harrison who claims
that "by acclimating themselves to local work arrangements, workers find
it psychologically as well as technically difficult to move from one
stratum of the economy to another."

31

The Culture of Poverty
This social class reproduction schema bears a close resemblance to
the socioanthropologlcal studies of Oscar Lewis on what he has labeled
the culture of poverty.

Lewis' criteria for the existence of a culture

of poverty parallels those offered by segmentation theorists for the
existence and functioning of secondary labor markets.

His relevant

criteria specify an organization of production characterized by:
(1)

A cash economy, wage labor and production for
profit,
(2) Persistently high rate of unemployment and
underemployment for unskilled labor,
(3) Low wages,
(4) The existence in the dominant class of a set
of values that stresses the accumulation of
wealth and property, the possibility of upward
mobility...and that explains low economic
status as the result of personal inadequacy
or inferiority.
Lewis maintains that

"the culture of poverty is both an adoption and a

30Cain. p.1223.
31
Bennett Harrison, "Additional Thoughts on the Dual Labor Market"
in Monthly Labor Review, (Vol.95, No.4, April 72, pp.37-39), p.37.
32
Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty" in On Understanding Poverty,
ed. Daniel P. Moynihan (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), pp.187-188.
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reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class stratified,
highly individuated, capitalistic society."

33

Descriptions of "street

corner lifestyles" in urban slum areas, such as those given by Elliot
Leibow in Tally's Corner, show that once one is immersed into a culture
of poverty, he is almost certain to remain there, not only for his
lifetime, but in all likelihood, for his offspring's as well.

34

The above views on the intergenerational transmission of unstable
life/work patterns are not wholly acceptable to many segmentation
theorists.

They tend to make barriers between secondary and primary

labor markets insurpassable.
necessarily so.

We shall see below that this is not

Even more important is the notion that workers become

psychologically conditioned to their work environment and are not able
to function outside of it.

Numerous studies have shown that the "hard

core" unemployed living in urban slum areas can develop stable working
habits, given that the organization which locates in the area provides
an environment conductive to the development of such traits.

35

Sar

Levitan, commenting on the results of I.B.M.'s decision to locate a
plant in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, New York, noted that
vandalism, arson, and theft have not been problems, the workers appear
motivated and responsible and high rates of absenteeism and labor

33Ibid. p. 188.
34
For a critique of this approach,see Charles A. Valentine's
Culture and Poverty. P. J. Andrisani tries to empirically test for the
existence of the culture of poverty in his Ph.D. thesis, An Empirical
Analysis of the Dual Labor Market Theory.
35
See Peter B. Doeringer, editor Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged,
for a series of case studies detailing the experiences of several com
panies which opened plants or set up training schools.in black inner
city slum areas.
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turnover have not been encountered.

36

In short, it is not psycholo

gical conditioning, but a lack of effective opportunities for choice
which results in secondary entrapment.
The role of secondary labor markets in the larger macroeconomy will
be discussed after I present the characteristics and functioning of
primary labor markets.

It is to the primary labor market that we now

turn our attention.
The Primary Labor Market
The primary labor market can be considered the diametric opposite
of the secondary market.

Primary occupations are relatively high pay

ing, stable, have good working conditions, changes for advancement and
equitable administration of work rules.

37

Although opportunities for

advancement exist, the range of occupations which usually lie in the
primary sector is quite diverse.

Some occupations are marked by a sub

stantial amount of autonomy, i.e., the worker has considerable control
over his job, while others lack autonomy.

This questions of degree of

autonomy has led some dualists to propose a subdivision of the primary
sector into upper and lower tiers according to the "amount of personal
participation in the production of the final good or service." 38
Nevertheless, primary occupations are considered to embody the basic
characteristics outlined above.

36
Sar A. Levitan, "Discussion of Edward C. Banfield An Act of
Corporate Citizenship: The I.B.M. Plant in Bedford-Stuyvesant" in
Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged, ed. Peter Doeringer (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1969), p.58.
37Piore, "On-the-Job..." p.102.
38
Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation"
in Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July, 1975)pp.508-523, p.510.
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Entry Conditions
As we shall see, the Internal administration of work rules in this
sector departs considerably from the traditional neoclassical analysis
of the operation of competitive markets.

Only at ports of entry into

primary jobs slots do market forces come into play.

Here too "non

economic" tastes and preferences of employers (and unions) act to limit
entry possibilities.

Clark Kerr writes:

the process of selection is also the process of
rejection. Decisions are made in favor of certain
individuals but at the same time against others.
The individuals which control these ports of entry
greatly affect the distribution of opportunities in
economic society. The rules that they follow deter
mine how equitably opportunity is spread and the
characteristics for which men are rewarded and for
which they are p e n a l i z e d . 39
Unlike the secondary market wherein labor power is perceived as a homo
genous commodity, primary employers are aware of differences among pro
spective employees, whether they be skin color, sex, or educational
status.
Primary market employers tend to rely quite heavily on educational
credentials in making their hiring decisions.

By using the high school

diploma as a prerequisite for employment, employers have a "quick and
allegedly inexpensive device for screening out...undesirable individuals."^
Bennett Harrison points out that the result of this practice is to
"screen out" minority workers who may well be capable of performing the
requisite job tasks.

41

Since minorities, on the average, tend to have

39
Kerr. p.102.
40
Bennett Harrison, Education, Training and the Urban Ghetto,
(Baltimore: the John Hopkins Press 1972), p.30.
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less education than white males, credentialism effectively serves to
maintain racial imbalance in primary labor markets.
The work of Bowles and Gintls on the functions of the educational
system under monopoly capitalism transcends the discriminatory aspects
cited above.

They argue that the major function of the educational

system is to replicate the existing social relations of production,
thereby ensuring all levels of capital a continuous source of labor
power.

42

Of importance to employers is that schools teach future

workers how to behave, i.e., punctuality, submission to authority, etc.

A3

This provides a convenient rationale for educational credentialism by
primary employers, in that screening out those with low levels of
education ensures them a labor force that will show up on time, follow
directions and value material incentives.
The entry process into primary market positions can be looked at in
terms of the queue theory of the labor market.

Workers are arrayed along

a continuum in order of their desirability to employers.

44

Employers,

given their tastes and preferences, choose their workers from as far up
the queue as possible.

45

According to the human capital school, those

prospective workers with the largest amounts of human capital investment
will occupy the top positions along the queue.

Employers are thus acting

quite rationally in selecting those workers who will make the largest

42
See Sam Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America for
an historical look at the development of educational institutions as
capitalism moved from its competitive to monopoly stages.
43
Samuel Bowles, "Contradictions in United States Higher Education"
in Modern Political Economy, ed. J. Weaver (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
1973), pp.81, 166.
44
Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination, (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution 1969), p.48.
45Ibid.
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net contributions to output.

Since wage rates are determined by labor’s

marginal productivity, the income differential between jobs in the
secondary sector and entry level primary positions can be explained, in
part, by the former's relatively lower marginal productivity.
The Internal Labor Market
After initial port of entry hiring decisions are made, the internal
labor market replaces the competitive external market.

Doeringer and

Piore define internal labor markets as "administrative units within
which the pricing and allocation of labor are governed by a set of
administrative rules and procedures."

46

Once in an internal labor

market, the worker is largely protected from external forces.

Pay

increases, promotions, seniority, dismissal and job grading are not
subject to market forces, but are determined through collective bargain
ing agreements and/or historically determined institutionalized mechanisms.
Work rules and procedures are clearly spelled out, providing guidelines
for both employees and management.

As a result, workers are protected

from arbitrary managerial decision making and have established grievance
procedures in the event of alleged abuses.
Michael Wachter describes the growth of internal labor markets and
their isolation from external labor market forces as follows:
...complex employment relationship(s) (have)
developed...because of the elaboration of tasks
that are specific to a job and hence require
specific training. Because of institutional
realities the competitive model's description

46
Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, "Equal Employment
Opportunity in Boston" in Industrial Relations (No. 9, 1969-1970, pp.324339), p.325.
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of a labor market based on demand and supply for
each job does not apply. Most jobs are unique and
lack an external market...New workers are used
principally to fill entry jobs while most higherlevel positions are filled by promotion from
within...Workers already in a firm...enjoy a degree
of monopoly over their jobs. '
That training in internal markets is specific goes a long way in explain
ing why turnover is lower in primary than secondary labor markets.
Gary Becker points out that employees with specific training have less
incentive to quit (they are earning more than they could elsewhere), and
firms have less incentive to fire them (the firm bore the cost of
training) than employees with no training or general training.^
In addition to holding a degree of monopoly over their current jobs,
workers in an internal market have a monopoly over the jobs on the next
rung of the internal job ladder.

Michael Piore has done considerable

research on worker mobility patterns in what he calls "an attempt to
formalize the intuitive notion that socioeconomic movement in our society
is not random but tends to occur in more or less regular channels."

49

He distinguishes points along these mobility chains stations, claiming
a particular station includes not only a job, but other points of social
and economic significance.
Piore is quick to note that mobility chains are found only in pri
mary internal labor markets.

In fact,

Michael L. Wachter, "Primary and Secondary Labor Markets: A
Critique of the Dual Approach" in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
(no.3, 1974, pp.637-693), p.643.
48
Gary S. Becker, Human Capital Second Edition, (New York: National
Bureau for Economic Research 1975), p.32.
49
Piore, Notes..." p.128.
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...the distinction between the primary and the
secondary sectors is that the mobility chains in
the former constitute some kind of ladder along
which there is progress towards higher paying and
higher status jobs. In the secondary sector...
jobs do not fall into any progression of this
kind: they are held in a more or less random
fashion....^
Most segmentation theorists would agree with Piore that the existence
and functioning of an internal labor market is the major distinction
between primary and secondary labor markets.
This concludes my descriptive review of the primary and secondary
labor market.

I will now present an operational framework for the

analysis of labor market duality.

This will enable us to see what a

dual labor market would look like if we could observe one in operation,
and provide a lead in for discussing macro-policy implications stemming
from the dualist approach to the study of labor markets.
An Operational Framework for the Study of Labor Market Duality
The existence of labor market duality in the macroeconomy is an
empirical issue which forms the base for the next three chapters of
this dissertation.

As a conceptual issue, however, the question is:

Would a cross sectional picture of the occupational structure, whether
confined to a local labor market or on a national scale, indicate the
presence of labor market duality?

Glen Cain provides an illustration

as to how such a test should proceed:
Assume that we could agree upon a unidimensional
scale to measure the quality...of occupations...
Let this measure of job quality be measured on the
horizontal axis and the number of workers on the
vertical axis. The simplest test of duality is
whether the resulting frequency distribution is
bimodal.^

5°Ibid. p.130.
51Cain.

p.1231.
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If we assume that most jobs reside in primary labor markets, then the
resulting frequency distribution would appear as follows:

Number of
Workers

Index of Job
Quality
secondary

primary

Jobs falling in the lower mode would be designated secondary, while
those further out from the origin on the horizontal axis would be
primary labor market jobs.
David Gordon makes an attempt at developing such a test in his
Ph.D. dissertation.

Gordon devises what he called a "dual labor market

factor" and finds it to be an important explicator of

the variancein

his data on occupations in two ghetto labor markets. A ranking

of jobs

by their scores on this factor was bimodally distributed, permitting a
separation of the jobs into primary and secondary clusters, with job
characteristics corresponding roughly to the hypothesized characteristics
in the two markets.

52

Gordon’s results indicate the viability

of Cain’s

conceptual approach to the study of labor market duality.

52
Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich and David M. Gordon, "Introduc
tion" in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et. al.
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co. 1975), p.xviii.
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The Extent of Secondary to Primary Mobility
Of equal, if not greater, importance is the degree to which the
barriers which separate the secondary from the primary labor market
prevent intermarket mobility.

Robert Flanagan goes as far as to state,

"the crux of any theory of labor market segmentation is the mechanism or
institutional barriers which truncate competition by precluding mobility
between the various labor market segments."

53

A strict interpretation

of the dual theory would hold that mobility between sectors is virtually
nonexistent; the sector in which a worker initially finds employment will
be the sector in which he will remain his entire working career.

A

less strict, and perhaps more tenable, interpretation would be that
mobility (primarily upward) can occur, but the reasons for such mobility
are external to the individual worker.
Since nonwhite workers are over represented in secondary sector
jobs, dual labor theory takes on aspects of being an economic theory of
discrimination.

If primary employers only hire white males, then blacks,

regardless of their education or level of competence, will be excluded
from the more attractive primary job slots and forced to accept degrading
secondary sector employment.

Flanagan points out:

it is not the inaccessibility of education that is
stressed by the dualists but the barriers emphasized .
include the culture of the ghetto...and overt disy
crimination by white employers and labor unions.
Even when nonwhites gain access to primary market occupations, discri
minatory policies act to channel them into mobility chains (internal
labor markets) which differ substantially in terms of promotional

53
Robert J. Flanagan, "Segmented Market Theories and Racial
Discrimination" in Industrial Relations (No. 12, October 1973, pp.25327.3), p.253.
54Ibid.

p.262.
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opportunities from those reserved for white male employees.

In internal

labor markets where white and nonwhite workers appear to move up the
ranks together, there may exist job ceilings for the latter, effectively
restricting supervisory and managerial positions to the domain of the
white workers.
Besides the discriminatory aspects, mobility out of the secondary
labor market is also restricted, due to the very nature of the social
relations of production in the low wage sectors of the economy.

Since

employment is usually transitory, on-the-job training is often absent,
and experience does not serve to increase productivity since performance
levels plateau after a very short time.

Howard Birnbaum sums up the

dualists' position on the effects of career origins by stating:
...once career origin is determined, opportunities for
future job movement can narrow because of discrimina
tion, limited opportunities for training, certification,
promotion, and the differential development of "affec
tive" personality traits.^
Hence, in the context of economic discrimination, most dualists
would argue that barriers separating the primary from the secondary
labor market can be reduced if government authorities strengthen the
enforcement of existing civil rights legislation.

Human resource

development programs aimed at increasing the human capital of minority
workers will not enable them to escape the confines of the secondary
labor market unless primary employers and unions can be forced to change
their hiring policies.
Critics of dual theory have argued that mobility from secondary to
primary labor markets occurs to an extent that cannot be reconciled with

55
Howard Birnbaum, "The Economic Effects of Career Origins" in
Edwards, et. al. op.cit., p. 154.
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the institutional barriers that dualists claim restrict mobility.
What is oftentimes overlooked is that such mobility is temporary in
nature and tends to coincide with expansionary periods of the business
cycle.

Primary employers may be willing to relax their hiring criteria

when labor markets for educated white males tighten, thereby granting
"temporary" primary status to secondary sector workers.

As soon as the

expansion peaks and the contraction stage of the cycle sets in, these
workers are let go and find themselves either unemployed or back in low
wage sector jobs.

Thus, the very structure of primary labor markets

serves to support and propagate hierarchical distinctions within the
working class.
Dual Labor Markets and Macro-Policy
While the incidence of intersector mobility is primarily an empiri
cal issue, on a conceptual level, the more strict interpretation of dual
labor theory provides a viable explanation for understanding why a
mature capitalist economy can experience rising levels of inflation in
the midst of high rates of unemployment.

Traditional Keynesian analysis

holds that Inflationary pressures come into being as aggregate demand
surges above full employment l e v e l s . W h e n aggregate demand falls short
of aggregate supply, producers cut back production and unemployment
results.

Since the Keynesian approach to unemployment is quite similar

to the queue theory, if government macro-policies stimulated expansion
then almost everyone in the line would be absorbed.

For a fuller discussion of traditional macro-policy and its
short-comings, see Howard Sherman's Stagflation A Radical Theory of
Unemployment and Inflation.
"^Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, "Unemployment and the
Dual Labor Market" in The Public Interest, (Number 38, Winter 1975)
pp.67-79), p.67.
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Due to excess capacity, prices would remain stable until the expansion
approached full employment levels of output.

Thus, Keynesian policy

can explain inflation or unemployment, not inflation and unemployment.
If the labor market is viewed as consisting of primary and secondary
sectors, then, given the structural barriers which limit mobility, an
explanation of unemployment and inflation becomes straightforward.

The

effects of expansionary fiscal and/or monetary policies are only felt in
primary labor markets.

As aggregate demand expands, labor supply in

primary labor markets tightens.

Since primary employers are reluctant

to alter their hiring practices, the expansion results in upward pres
sure on wages and prices.
The secondary labor market, on the other hand, remains largely
unaffected by expansionary macro-policy.

The chronically high rates of

unemployment and instability which characterize this sector persist,
despite the attempts of policy makers to reduce unemployment.

What we

end up with is a worsening of the unemployment inflation dilemma; there
is more inflation yet no reduction in unemployment. In other words,
traditional policy results in outward shifts in the Phillips curve,
even though this was not what the policy makers had in mind.
There are several implications for public policy which follow from
this approach.

Piore argues that expansion must entail more than just

the creation of new jobs.

He states, "the added jobs must be primary

and secondary workers must be hired to perform them."

58

Fiscal policies

should be aimed directly at the secondary work force, whether they be in
the form of incentives for private industry to locate in depressed
areas, or the expansion of public employment.

CO

Piore, "On-the-Job..."

p.123,

If the latter is structured
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In such a way as to provide a viable alternative to secondary private
employment, competitive pressure may force low wage industries to
upgrade and take on primary market characteristics.

This, along with

antidiscrimination policies to open up primary markets, will, according
to most dualists, reduce unemployment rates without contributing to
inflationary pressures in the economy.
Radical Interpretations
The most important contribution of radical economists to dual
labor theory has centered around their attempt to integrate the process
of market segmentation into the dynamics of monopoly capitalism.

Reich,

Gordon, and Edwards define labor market segmentation as the:
historical process whereby political-economic forces
encourage the division of the labor market into
separate submarkets, or segments, distinguished by
different labor market characteristics and behavior
rules.
Although some radicals claim the labor market is divided into numerous
noncompeting sectors,^

most radicals would have little trouble with the

dualist dichotomization of the labor market into primary and secondary
sectors discussed above.
What the radicals emphasize are the ramifications of market segmen
tation on the ability of the working class to develop a unified conscious
ness and awareness of their position as a class in opposition to capital.^

59
Michael Reich, David M. Gordon and Richard C. Edwards, "A Theory
of Labor Market Segmentation" in American Economic Review (May 1973,
pp.359-365), p.359.
*^See Barry Bluestone, et. al., Low Wages and the Working Poor, Ch.2.
^See Stanley Aronowitz False Promises for a useful discussion of
the barriers to the formation of class consciousness.
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According to Howard Wachtel, "fragmentation of the working class...has
eroded and negated the tendency toward the consolidation of a working
62
class."

Fostering divisions within the working classes has histori

cally served the interests of capital.

Radicals point out that discri

minatory hiring policies, differential job ladders and market segmenta
tion create a stratified working class in which the more priveledged
workers seek to isolate and protect their advantages.

Thus, labor

market segmentation, by dividing workers, aids in the reproduction of
capitalist hegemony.^
Capitalist Development and the Segmentation of Labor Markets
Marx's description of the general laws of capitalist development
provides a starting point for most radical analyses of labor market
stratification.

Marx was aware that over time, competitive capital

would give way to increasing concentration of capital.

It was during

this transition from competitive to monopoly capital that segmentation
of the labor market arose.

64

Although this may sound similar to the

institutionalists cited earlier, radicals add that segmentation of the
labor force was a response by capital to the homogenization of the
work force and the increasing removal of individual skills which may
have encouraged worker solidarity as a class.

This is quite different

from the institutionalist's view that internal job structures developed
with the "growing diversification and specialization of jobs."

62
Howard M. Wachtel, "Class Consciousness and Stratification in the
Labor Process" in Edwards et. al., op. cit., p.99.
^Reich.

p. 364.

64Reich.

p.360.
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Katherine Stone, in an excellent review of the development of
Internal labor markets in the steel industry, concludes that "the
development of hierarchy in the labor force was not in response to the
increased complexity of jobs, but rather a device to counter the
increased simplicity and homogeneity of jobs."^~*

Stone notes that the

institution of the job ladder served the interests of capital in two
ways:
First, it gave workers a sense of vertical mobility
...and was an incentive to work harder...(Second)
was that it gave employers more leverage in which to
maintain discipline. The system pitted each worker
against all others in rivalry for advancement and
undercut any feeling of unity which might develop
among them. °
The important thing to realize is that at the same time the internal
market developed, the fragmentation and simplification of individual
jobs reached its highest level.
Stone's findings for the steel industry can be generalized to
account for the widespread development of internalized labor structures.
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards argue that the increasing oligopolization of
industry was threatened by the proletarianized work force which, in the
competitive era, became a homogeneous commodity.87

In order to combat

the increasing social nature of large scale production, capital embarked
on a tactic to divide the work force.

The results of this were the

institution of new managerial techniques, internal job ladders, and
hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of production.

68

65
Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel
Industry" in Edwards, et. al., op. cit., p. 28.
66Ibid. pp.46-47.
67Reich.
68Ibid.

p.362.

30

Radicals do not offer much in the way of public policy.

Basically,

the radical view is that since a segmented labor force is functional
to capitalist hegemony and since the state exists to serve the interests
of capitalists, it is unreasonable to expect any significant policies
to aid disadvantaged secondary workers.
Conclusions
The purpose of this literature review was to provide an analytic
description of the primary and secondary labor market and to indicate
the major trends of thought relating to labor market segmentation.

The

brief historical review of noncompeting groups showed dual theory has had
considerable precedence in the annals of economic thought.

What dis

tinguishes the dual approach from earlier theories is its growing
acceptance among economists and its applicability to such important
contemporary issues as the perpetuation of low-wage sectors of the
economy, the plight of disadvantaged workers, and the co-existence of
rising rates of inflation and high levels of unemployment.

Although neo

classical theory remains the dominant view of most establishment economists,
segmented labor market theories have won wide appeal to many younger, left
leaning economists.

There is no doubt that this acceptance reflects the

increasing problems of neoclassical theory in trying to explain an
objective reality characterized by monopoly capitalism, discrimination,
and other institutional constraints.
In the following chapter, I review several attempts at constructing
empirical models of labor markets in order to determine the existence of
duality.

Some of the problems encountered in going from a conceptual to

empirical framework will be discussed, especially how one defines
occupations as residing in the primary or secondary labor market.

I hope

that by combining the detailed conceptual description of the secondary
and primary sectors with the presentation of the results of econometric
models depicting market duality, I will give the reader a thorough
background in segmentation theory.

I will then be in a position to

discuss my own contributions to this field.

CHAPTER III

EMPIRICAL STUDIES REVIEW
In recent years, a small but growing number of economists have
tried to substantiate or refute the existence of labor market segmen
tation by means of empirical models.

The purpose of this chapter is to

review several of the more important econometric studies of labor
market duality, in order to determine the extent to which the models
reflect the conceptual hypothesis of dual theory, to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the models, and to pinpoint areas where additional
research is needed.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the

"truncation problem", followed by a review of the ways in which
researchers have classified occupations as primary and secondary.

I

then discuss three basic types of regression models which have appeared
in the literature:

(1) wage and earnings models, (2) probability of

primary employment models, and (3) mobility models.

The chapter con

cludes with my suggestions as to where further research is warranted
and what I plan to do to advance the state of knowledge of dual labor
markets.
A serious methodological issue has been levied against empirical
studies of labor market segmentation.
problem.

This is the so-called truncation

Glen G. Cain, in a lengthy critique of segmentation theory,

asserts:
...tests almost invariably suffer from a methodo
logical flaw - that of fitting the regression to
a sample that is truncated on the values of the
dependent variable - with the result that the esti
mated coefficients (effects) that the independent
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variables are biased.^
What Cain is claiming is that if we demarcate secondary jobs according
to low educational levels, skill requirements, income, and so forth,
and then run regressions using these variables to explain income differ
entials, the coefficients of the independent variables will be biased
downward, leading to conclusions that human capital variables do not
influence earnings in the secondary labor market.

The flaw lies in

that we have previously defined secondary jobs as those requiring minimal
human capital endowments, so that we have assumed the existence of the
relationship we are actually trying to test for.
Cain presents the truncation problem diagramatically as follows:
Suppose we take an earnings/education profile for all workers, and
estimate the relation between the two factors.

We may end up with the

profile given in the diagram below, where line 'a' is the best fitting
line for the entire sample.

2

Earnings

E
1

Educational
.Attainment

0

If we truncate the sample at E^, and label jobs with earnings OE^ secon
dary, and fit a regression on this subsample (line 'b'), we "guarantee

^Glen G. Cain, "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to
Othodox Theory: A Survey", Journal of Economic Literature (Dec. 1976,
Vol. XIV, No. 4), p.1246.
2Ibid.

p.1247.
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that the simple regression relation between education and earnings will
3

be lessened (or even) approach zero."

What Cain acknowledges, but

delegates to a footnote, is that the downward bias is only guaranteed if
the model tested is of the form:
Earn =

Educ +y

When multiple regression is used, there is no longer any guarantee of a
4
downward bias.
Since all the segmentation models discussed here, as well as the
ones to be developed in future chapters, use multiple regression analysis,
Cain's claim of guaranteed bias leading to results favorable to dual
theory is called into question.

I am not saying there is no chance of

downwardly biased regression coefficients - only that such results are
not internally guaranteed given the specification of the models.

Since

the problem has its origins in the formulation of primary-secondary
classification schemes, it seems fitting to begin our discussion of
empirical studies by looking at the various ways researchers have clas
sified occupations.
Classification Systems
In his Ph.D. thesis, Paul Andrisani devises a classification system
based on 1960 Census reported median earnings of the male labor force
for three digit occupational and industrial codes.

Based on these earn

ings, Andrisani claims that occupations and industries may be hierarchi
cally ranked, and cut-off points determined, for defining jobs as primary

3Ibid.

p.1246.

^Arthur Goldberger, "Linear Regression in Truncated Samples" cited
in Cain op. cit., p.1246.
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or secondary.

The cut-off points he establishes are such that jobs

are considered primary if:
1)

the occupation is one with median earnings
greater than or equal to the median of the
entire male labor force and the industry is
one with median earnings of at least $4303, or

2)

the industry is one with median earnings greater
than or equal to the median of the entire male
labor force and the occupation is one with median
earnings of at least $4187.^

Jobs were deemed secondary if:
1)

occupation is one with median earnings below $4187
and the industry is one with median earnings below
the median of the entire male labor force, or

2)

the industry is one with median earnings below
$4303 and the occupation is one with median earn
ings below the median of the entire male labor
force.7

The cut-off points of $4303 and $4187 were selected on the grounds that
industries (occupations) with median earnings below $4303 ($4187)

g
employed one-third of the total male labor force in 1959.
In an appendix to his thesis, Andrisani attempts to justify his
classification criteria by means of factor analysis, and by comparing
his results with the responses of a panel of eleven knowledgeable labor
market analysts who were asked to rank occupations as secondary,
intermediate, primary or uncertain.

He does not give us any numerical

breakdowns as to the number of secondary (primary) occupations, or cite
examples of secondary jobs so that we can see the "results" of classi
fying occupations in this manner.

Furthermore, he states that there are

^Paul J. Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market
Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.35.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.

p.36.
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some jobs which are considered neither primary nor secondary, but again
we are not told how many, or which jobs fall into this "intermediate"
category.
A more basic criticism that can be levied against classifying occupa
tions in terms of income levels is that such a system does not take into
9
account the nature of jobs.
While earnings figure predominantely in
demarcating occupations as primary or secondary, other factors also have
to be taken into account.

These include the issues of control and worker

autonomy, status, preparation, i.e., educational and/or vocational, and
stability of employment.

While these may be highly correlated with

earnings, it is by no means inherently safe to assume so.

On the other

hand, trying to incorporate these types of characteristics increases the
subjectivity of one's classification system.
Paul Osterman, in an article entitled, "An Empirical Study of Labor
Market Segmentation", divides census occupations into three groups:
Secondary jobs, lower tier primary and upper tier primary occupations.
Secondary sector jobs are demarcated according to the usual characteris
tics of these jobs, i.e., low wages, Instability of employment, etc.,
while the distinction between upper and lower tier primary occupations
is based on the "degree of autonomy and personal participation enjoyed
by workers in that occupation.
After acknowledging the inherent subjectivity involved in any
attempt to segment occupations, Osterman states, "the author's judgement
was used to place each occupation in its proper segment."

11

9
MichaelA. Carter and Martin Carney, Theories of Labor Markets and
Worker Productivity (discussion paper 74-7, Menlo Park, Calif., Portola
Institute, 1974), p. 46.
■^Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation" in
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (July 1975), p.513.

The resulting classification system, given in the appendix to his study,
shows that, "there is a high degree of correspondence between the upper
tier (of the primary labor market) and the top segment of the Duncan
12

(Socio-economic Index) scale

and between the secondary sector and the

lower tail of the Duncan scale".

13

Since the Duncan index depends, in

part, on educational and income levels, occupations in Osterman's upper
tier are, for the most part, high income and education occupations,
while those in the secondary sector are low income, low education jobs.
One of the most comprehensive attempts to devise a primary/secondary
classification system can be found in Samuel Rosenberg's Ph.D. thesis,
"The Dual Labor Market:

Its Existence and Consequences".

Rosenberg

makes use of a dissertation by Robert E.B. Lucas, "Working Conditions,
Wage Rates and Human Capital:

A Hedonic Study", which "links the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles job classification system with that
of the Bureau of the Census."^

This gives detailed job characteristics

of the more broadly defined census occupation classifications.

Since

Rosenberg classifies census occupations as primary or secondary, this
"link up" with D.O.T. information permitted in-depth analysis of the
content of occupations prior to primary/secondary specification.
Rosenberg starts by noting five basic characteristics of secondary
jobs:
(1)
(2)
(3)
12

Low pay,
Poor working conditions,
High labor turnover,

Otis D. Duncan, "A Socioeconomic Index for all Occupations", in
Occupations and Social Status, ed. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (New York: Free
Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1961), pp.263-275.
13
Osterman, p.513.
14
Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Con
sequences" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,1975),
p.32.
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(4) Little chance for advancement,
^
(5) Arbitrary and capricious supervision.
His procedure may be summarized as follows:

Secondary jobs skill

requirements should not be determined by educational levels because of
artificially imposed credentialism, but by the level of Specific
Ovcational Preparation (SVP) and General Educational Developement (GED)
required for their performance.

He argues that if a Census occupation

has a 0.6 probability of an SVP level of less than three (job takes less
than 3 months to learn), the occupation may be a secondary one.
similar argument is posed for GED levels.

16

A

Also included is a "variable

which measures whether a job involves doing tasks only under specific
instructions allowing little or no room for independent action or judge
ment in working out problems."'*'7

If a Census occupation displays a

strong probability of having this trait, it may be a secondary job.
Since income is an important determinant, Rosenberg uses the BLS mini
mum budget for a family of four as a cut-off point.

He accurately points

out that there are some job characteristics (supervising, instructing,
planning activities of others) in addition to high wages, which in and
of themselves warrant the occupation a primary classification.

18

If, using Rosenberg's terminology, we demarcate SVP, GED, instruc
tion and low wages to be secondary job criteria, and the remainder
(supervising, high wages, etc.) to be primary job criteria, then:

15Ibid. p.37.
16Ibid.

p.40.

17Ibid.

p.43.
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A job is said to be secondary if it qualifies for
secondary employment on (a) all four criteria and
is not eliminated by the other criteria, (b) on
three criteria and is not eliminated by the other
criteria or (c) on SVP and hour wa »es ana. is
. non
.
eliminated by the other criteria. ^
Rosenberg admits that a certain amount of personal judgement enters
the analysis, insofar as some jobs which turned out to be secondary were
respecified simply because he felt they better belonged in the primary
sector.

Nevertheless, I judge this approach to be superior to any of

the other classification systems I have had at my disposal.

This system

accounts for the nature of secondary jobs far for thoroughly than
Andrisani's income determination schema, and is obviously more scientific
than simply using one's own personal judgement, as was the case with
Osterman.

It is for these reasons that I have decided to use Rosenberg's

occupational classification system as the basis for demarcating jobs as
primary or secondary in the models I develop in the ensuing chapters.
Wage and Earnings Models
Andrisani's wage determination model produces results only mildly
supportive of dual labor theory.

He does find that within the primary

sector, for white workers, educational attainment, age, and status
(Duncan Index) of first job were directly related to rates of pay.

20

This is obviously consistent with the dualist view that within the pri
mary market, human capital factors systematically affect earnings.

It

is interesting to note that educational attainment, measured in either
continuous form or in terms of high school graduation, increases primary,

19
Ibid. p.55.
20

Andrisani, p. 79.
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nonwhite earnings significantly more than for primary whites.

On the

other hand, age, used as a proxy for experience, is not significant for
blacks.

Andrisani concludes that, "among blacks in primary jobs...the

data do not suggest as systematic a screening process as is observed
among the whites."

21

The results most at odds with the dual theory are those for secon
dary sector whites and blacks.

According to the dualists, human capital

factors should not serve to predict earnings, nor should employers
exercise any systematic preference functions in their hiring practices
in secondary labor markets.

These basic propositions are not substan

tiated in the Andrisani model, in that for secondary whites, educational
attainment (continuous and discrete), age and marital status are all
significant and important explicators of wages rates; while for blacks,
graduation and marital status prove significant.

22

Hence, Andrisani

questions the widely held dualist view that variations in wages should
be unrelated to levels of human capital.

He points out that "even in

the secondary labor market employers...appear to differentiate between
blacks with high school degrees and those with lesser amounts of
education."

23

Using the triparte classification system discussed earlier, Osterman
ran a series of earnings determination regression models in order to
determine whether or not the wage setting process differs between the
primary (upper and lower tier) and the secondary labor market.

21

Andrisani.

22
23

p.79.

Andrisani.

pp.78, 82.

Andrisani.

p.81.

His
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results are highly favorable to segmentation theory in that,
in the secondary labor market earnings (depended)
only on the amount of time worked. Experience did
not contribute to earnings, nor did education (or
race).24
In addition, his findings reveal these same variables to be significant
explicators of earnings in both the upper and lower tier of the primary
market.

Osterman's interpretation of his results suggests that the

human capital model explains earnings determination only in the primary
market.

Secondary employers do not differentiate among workers, while

primary employers stress factors such as race, age and education in their
hiring decisions.
He concludes by noting that the failure of manpower programs can be
attributed in part to the realization that these programs are not
"attuned to the realities of the labor market" since "policies designed
to augment the human capital of secondary workers are not likely to
improve their earnings."

25

William Kruse, in a recent comment on Osterman’s model, claims the
favorable (from a dualist perspective) results stem from the way Osterman
classifies occupations producing a downward bias on the coefficients of
the human capital variables for secondary worker earning function.

26

He further criticizes Osterman's use of a cross sectional earnings func
tion to generate policy recommendations which require longitudinal data.
According to Kruse,
the implications of labor market segmentation that
have relevance for public policy are derived from
the alleged restrictions of a certain group of
individuals to 'dead end' or secondary jobs...(This)

"^Osterman. p.513.
25
Osterman. p.521.
26
William J. Kruse, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation:
Comment" in Industrial and Labor Relations Review (Vol.30, No.7, Jan.1977),
p.223.

cannot be tested via the estimation of separate
cross sectional earnings functions...need longi
tudinal (studies).... 2'
Thus, Kruse stresses the mobility aspects of policy programs within the
dualist context.

It is not surprising to find that education and/or

training fail to increase secondary earnings.

The intention of human

investment programs, he argues, "is to enable participants to move into
nonsecondary jobs."

28

Since Osterman uses only cross sectional data,

his results cannot be considered damaging to the "efficacy of human
capital investment programs."
Osterman's reply to Kruse's critique is several fold.

First, he

claims his classification system does not result in truncating the
sample along the dependent variable.

29

As we saw earlier, Osterman

tries to incorporate such factors as autonomy, working conditions and job
stability in deciding

into which segment an occupation belongs.

However,

the close parallel between his system and the Duncan index does indicate
earnings are an important factor in determining which occupations are
primary and secondary.
Osterman's response to Kruse's claim that longitudinal data are
necessary to determine the efficacy of human investment programs is
not overly convincing.

Basically, he states that his intention was to

discover whether the relationship between earnings and several key vari
ables differs in different segments of the labor market, and whether the
differences conform to those predicted by dual labor market theory.

30

27Ibid. p.220.
28Ibid.
29
Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation:
Reply" in Industrial and Labor Relations Review (Vol.30, No.7, Jan.1977),
p.223.
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Finding that conformity exists does strengthen the dual theory, but
his failure to examine the mobility issue tempers viability of his
policy recommendations.

The policy implications Osterman derives from

his study are consistent with dual labor theory, namely that policies
should be aimed at changing labor demand conditions, as opposed to
improving the human capital (supply side) of secondary workers.

What

remains subject to controversy is whether or not this recommendation
logically follows from the results of his model.

Hopefully, the models

discussed in the following chapter which include mobility aspects will
shed some light on this issue.
Probability of Primary Employment Models
Andrisani has devised a model which examines the likelihood of a
worker's first job being in the primary labor market.

The rationale

for such a model lies in the dualist continention that a worker will
remain in the sector in which he first finds employment.

Andrisani's

results indicate that educational attainment, measured either in years
completed or in terms of graduation status, significantly increases the
probability of primary employment for whites.

Among blacks, however,

"educational attainment appears of little consequence and black dropouts
fare no worse than graduates."

31

In order to account for the fact that within his sample workers began
their careers under different phases of the business cycle, Andrisani
includes a variable to measure labor market conditions at the time of
initial entry into the work force.

Specifically, a dummy variable was

used such that if first job occurred prior to 1964, a zero was assigned,

31
Andrisani.

p.61.
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while if first job occurred between 1964 and 1966, a one was assigned.

32

His finding that for whites the probability of a primary first job is
higher when labor markets are tight, while for blacks labor market conditions do not make much difference,

33

supports segmentation theory,

since blacks, as a result of their over representation in the secondary
sector, do not stand to benefit from expansionary aggregate demand
policies which are confined to mainstream labor markets.
Socioeconomic origins are statistically significant for both color
groups.

Although this result supports dual and radical interpretations

of the labor process, severe multicollinearity among the regressors in
his model dampens the viability of his results.
Samuel Rosenberg has developed a two-equation model which, in
addition to observing the effects of human capital variables on a worker's
current labor market status, addresses itself to the influence that a
worker's first job has on the probability of current employment in the
primary labor market.

Since I use a similar model, a more detailed

discussion of the format of this type of model can be found in the
following chapter.

Here it will be sufficient to discuss some of

Rosenberg's more important findings.
His data indicate that a worker who began his career in the primary
market is quite likely to be currently employed in a primary sector occu
pation.

In fact, a primary first job was found to increase the probability

of primary current job by at least 20 percent.

34

With respect to the influence of educational levels on the probability

32
Andrisani.
33
Andrisani.
^Rosenberg,

p.44.
p.65.
p.128.
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of primary employment, the results are somewhat surprising.

College

attendance, as expected, increased the probability of primary employment,
but there was no significant difference between completion of 9-11
years of schooling and high school graduation in terms of increasing
the likelihood of primary employment.

Thus, Rosenberg states:

There does not seem to be a credential effect in
terras of finishing high school leading to a great
increase in the conditional probability of holding
a primary job over the completion of just 9-11
years of schooling.35
For some groups, participation in a vocational training program
significantly increased the likelihood of primary employment, while
for other groups no significant relationship was found.

36

Finally, his

data suggest that experience (years in the labor force) does not increase
the probability of current employment in the primary sector.

He cor

rectly points out that this result
is consistent with the expectations of dual labor
market theory which argues that increased labor
force experience does not necessarily lead to
greater probability of primary employment for it
depends on whether this experience is in the
primary or secondary labor market.37
Mobility Models
Several empirical studies have included a model to determine the
likelihood of upward, secondary to primary, mobility.

Basically, these

models examine the incidence of mobility for workers in the secondary
sector in time period t, who at a later date (t + m) have either remained
35
Rosenberg, p.123.
36
There was little uniformity as to which color groups benefited
from vocational training. In some cities, vocational training was sig
nificant for blacks, in others whites, and in one both benefited.
37
Rosenberg, p.127.
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in the secondary market or have moved into primary market occupations.
A vector of explanatory variables is postulated and regression analysis
is performed, in order to determine which, if any, variables act to
systematically affect the probability of mobility.
Andrisani includes such a model in his thesis.

He finds neither

educational attainment nor vocational training to increase the likelihood
of upward mobility.

Even after respecifying his model by including a

dummy variable to differentiate between high schoool graduates and
dropouts, his data indicate, "there is no evidence that graduates are
more likely to advance to primary jobs than dropouts."

38

Moreover,

the results of his model lead Andrisani to conclude:
...manpower policies aimed at moving disadvantaged
youths from secondary to primary jobs by investing
in their human capital (education and.training)...can
draw no support from these findings.
For whites, the only important explanatory variable was marital
status, while for blacks, region of the country (1 if not South, 0 if
South) was significant and important.

After running the basic model in

a slightly different form, age was found to increase the likelihood
of secondary to primary mobility for white workers.

Thus, Andrisani

concludes, "secondary sector confinement...seems to result (in part)
from insufficient labor market e x p o s u r e . T h i s conclusion warrants
comment, because dual theory would be expected to be opposite

continuous

exposure in the secondary labor market reduces the likelihood of upward
mobility.

Andrisani does not attempt to provide an explanation for this

38
Andrisani.
39
Andrisani.
^Andrisani.

p.73.
p.69.
p. 76.
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result.

The question of the relation between age (experience) and

labor market status will be reexamined and treated at greater length
in the chapter where I develop several labor market models.
Samuel Rosenberg's upward mobility model fucuses mainly on educa
tion and training as factors which affect the probability of moving from
the secondary to the primary labor market.

The model was used to examine

the likelihood of mobility for whites and blacks in Brooklyn, Cleveland,
Detroit, and San Francisco.

41

Since the relative importance of educa

tion and training in explaining mobility differed widely not only
between whites and blacks, but also within color cohorts in different
cities, it is difficult to provide a general summary of his results.
Nevertheless, several patterns are apparent.

Vocational training,

whether acquired while in school or in an institutional program, did not
/ 0

prove significant in increasing the probability of upward mobility.

/ *5

’

Years in the labor force do not significantly increase the likelihood
of upward mobility.

Whereas a significant negative relation between

years in the labor force and the probability of mobility would have been
highly supportive of dual labor theory, Rosenberg accurately points out
that his results are "consistent with the dual labor market hypothesis
which argues that increased experience in the secondary labor market
would not necessarily lead to upward mobility." 44 ’ 45
41
For Brooklyn and San Francisco, separate regressions were also run for
Spanish workers.
42
Rosenberg, p.151.
43
The sole exception was San Francisco blacks.
44
Rosenberg, p.152.
45
Rosenberg's findings concerning experience and mobility differ from
Andrisani in that the latter argued confinement in the secondary sector
resulted from a lack of labor market exposure.

48

The most serious problem lies in trying to ascertain a distinct
pattern with regard to the role of education in the mobility process.
For whites in Brooklyn, and San Francisco, and Detroit blacks, "the
education variables are significant...and the pattern shows that the
more education one has, the greater the...probability of upward mobility."

46

For Cleveland whites and Brooklyn and San Francisco blacks, however,
virtually none of the educational variables proved significant.

The

former results tend to substantiate the "human capital approach to mobility",
while the latter sugest that mobility, when it occurs, is in essence a
random occurrence.

This leads Rosenberg to conclude:

the education results are such that all that can
be said is that increasing years of education
^
may increase a person's chances of upward mobility.
In a recent article in The Journal of Human Resources, Duane E. Leigh
presents a model which measures occupational mobility in such a way as
to make preassigning occupations primary or secondary unnecessary.

Using

1970 Census and N.L.S. data, Leigh examines the determinants of occupa
tional change for males in several age race cohort groupings.

Instead of

demarcating mobility in terms of movement from the secondary to the
primary labor market, he measures occupational upgrading or downgrading
on the basis of the change in the median income of the respondent's
occupational classification system occupation in 1970, compared with his
O.C.S. median income.

48

46
Rosenberg, p.150.
47
Rosenberg, p.150.
48
Duane E. Leigh, "Occupational Advancement in the Late 1960's: An
Indirect Test of the Dual Labor Market Hypothesis" in The Journal of
Human Resources, (Vol.XI, No.2, Spring 1976), p.159.
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Leigh incorporates this methodology into the dualist perspective by
denoting two propositions of dual theory:
(1) Secondary jobs are characterized by a lack
of occupational upgrading, and
(2) Black workers are disproportionately confined
to the secondary sector,
and two testable hypotheses:
(1) Large and systematic racial distinctions
exist in the effect of interfirm mobility
on occupational advancement, and
(2) Large and systematic racial differentials
in intrafirm occupational advancement
exist for workers of equivalent endowments.
Given Leigh's interpretation of dual labor theory, his empirical
results indicate that there are no major differences in employment
stability between whites and blacks in comparable age cohorts.

Further

more, "the impact of interfirm and interindustry shifts on occupational
advancement does not appear to be systematically larger for whites than
for b l a c k s . T h i s leads him to reject his first hypothesis.

Additional

results, according to Leigh, call for the rejection of the second hypothesis
as well.

Both rejections are interpreted as providing support for neo

classical labor market theory.
Leigh's analysis and methodology invite criticism on several counts.
First, even the most cursory reading of dualist literature indicates
that there are nonwage factors which must be considered when ranking occu
pations.

Coincident with this is the realization that the secondary sec

tor is not perfectly competitive; wage rates, although low throughout,
are not entirely uniform.
49
Ibid. p.156.
5°Ibid. p.169.

It is possible for a worker to move from one

-
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low wage job to another not quite so low wage job.

This would tend to

show up as an improvement in the present context, even though the worker
may well have remained in the secondary sector.

Finally, nowhere is the

reader given any indication of the explanatory power of Leigh's models.
Since using median occupational income rather than reported individual
income can inject rather large errors into his dependent variables, it
would not be surprising to find that Leigh's models have very little
explanatory power.
Conclusions
The empirical models discussed in this chapter indicate that there is
considerable diversification of opinion concerning the existence and func
tioning of dual labor markets.

Based upon their empirical results, con

clusions regarding the existence of segmented labor markets range from
outright rejection of their existence (Leigh) to strong acceptance
(Osterman). While it is my feeling that no econometric model can unequi
vocally prove the existence of labor market segmentation, previous research
does indicate serious deficiencies in the traditional human capital queue
theory approach to the labor market.

The dual theory provides a viable

alternative explanation of the labor process.
Numerous problems remain which the earlier research has not been able
to come to terms with.

Although Rosenberg's classification system con

stitutes a marked advance over Andrisani's, there remains a need for a
generally agreed upon dichotomization of occupations into primary and
secondary sectors.

Additional evidence concerning the functioning of

labor markets in diverse geographic locales, such as predominantely nonurban labor markets, has been absent from the current literature.

Such

information is needed in order to make dual labor theory a more general
theory of the labor process.

Finally, it would be desirable to see a
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shift In research methodology away from the over-reliance upon econometric
model building towards case studies of the structure of labor markets
from which firms draw their manpower needs.
The following chapters constitute my attempt to improve and advance
the state of knowledge of dual labor market theory.

Two of the problems

stated above will be directly addressed, namely the use of a sample which
is largely composed on nonurban labor markets, and the inclusion of a
case study of a local New Hampshire labor market.

By combining econometric

models with a case study, I hope to present a lucid description of New
England labor markets, thereby gaining additional insight into the viability
of dual labor market theory.

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL MODELS
The Data Base
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the econometric models
which will be used in subsequent chapters to test for labor market seg
mentation in New England.

I begin by noting the data source and its

appropriateness for examining dual labor theory.

Next, I look at some

of the limitations in the data base, specifically the numerical insigni
ficance of nonwhite respondents.

Finally, the three models are specified

and the variables and their expected coefficients are discussed in the
context of dual labor market theory.
The source of data used to test the segmentation models is the 1970
Census of Population Public Use Sample tapes.

In addition to personal

and household characteristics such as marital status, age, education,
occupation, etc., the Census in 1970, for the first time, included
questions concerning the type of occupation the respondent was employed
at five years earlier, i.e., in 1965.^

By classifying the 1965 and 1970

occupations as primary or secondary, we can use the data to ascertain
the importance of the previous sector of employment on current labor
market standing.

Furthermore, knowledge of labor market status five

years ago is necessary in order to determine the probability of inter
sectoral, secondary to primary, mobility.

Stanely Greene and others. "The 1970 Census of Population Occupation
Classification System" in Statistical Reporter (No. 70-6, December 1967),
pp.77-84.

The limitations encountered in using the Census data are twofold.
First, for several New England states, the Census data does not specify
whether or not the respondent resided in an S.M.S.A. or in an urban or
rural area.

Thus, it is not possible to include a variable demarcating

area of residence within a state.

Given that there are relatively few

urban areas in Northern New England, the segmentation models will not be
confined to urban labor markets, as has been the case with most earlier
studies, but will test for the existence of, and factors contributing to,
duality in an area which contains rural labor markets as well as urban
markets.
The second limitation is more endemic to the population mix in New
England than to the Census data for the U.S. as a whole.

It turns out

that there are too few nonwhite observations to warrant either the
inclusion of race as a variable or to run separate regressions dividing
the sample by race.

The exclusion of a race variable may make for a

rather severe test of labor market duality, since racial distinctions
have consistently been a major facet of the theory and related policy
prescriptions.

It must be remembered, however, that segmentation theory

is not just an economic theory of discrimination.

Low wage secondary

jobs are sometimes manned by whites, indicating that the factors which
may be attributed to the segmentation process operate across racial
boundaries.
Specification of the Models: Earnings Determination
The first model I plan to test is a set of earnings equations simi
lar to those used by neoclassical economists to estimate the effect of a
vector of human capital variables on annual earnings.

In the dual labor

market context, the model serves to test the influence of the independent
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variables on earnings in both the primary and secondary labor markets.
In order to conform with labor market segmentation theory, certain variables
should prove significant and important with respect to primary market
earnings, but not significant in the secondary labor market.
It should be pointed out that this model does not test for the
existence of dual labor markets.
postulation.

That duality exists is an a priori

The primary and secondary labor markets are demarcated

according to the classification system previously discussed.

What I

hope to show in these equations is that factors which are commonly said to
influence earnings do not operate in a systematic fashion across the
entire occupational spectrum.

This can be accomplished by specifying a

single earnings equation; running it separately on the primary and secon
dary labor markets and observing the significance of the independent
variables as explicators of earnings within and between the two sectors.
The model to be tested is specified as follows:
EARN = a + a. HSG + a~ 'Exp' + a~ Wks + a. VocT + ac Class + u
o
1
2
r
3
4
5
where
EARN = Annual income for males aged 25-55 in the occupational cohort groupings,
HSG = A dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if the respondent completed
12 or more years for formal education (high school graduate) and a value
of 0 if less than 12 years of schooling were completed (did not graduate
high school),
'Exp' = Potential labor force experience,
Wks = Weeks worked during 1969,
VocT = A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the respondent participated
in a vocational training program and 0 if no vocational training was
undertaken,

Class = Class of Worker, a dummy variable used to demarcate those persons
employed in the private sector (1) from those in the public sector

(0),
u

is an error term.

Explanation of Variables
High school graduation status is used in the models to test for the
existence of a diploma effect on employment opportunities and remuneration
for both secondary and primary market workers.

I have incorporated educa

tion in the model in this manner, in lieu of using education as a con
tinuous variable measuring years of educational attainment, because I feel
there is a qualitative, as well as quantitative, impact on the returns to
schooling that accrue as a result of obtaining a high school diploma.

This

is "smoothed" over when education is used as a continuous variable.
When education is defined as years of schooling completed, the
coefficient (g) on education in an earnings model is interpreted as the
amount by which income rises for each additional year of schooling completed.
Thus, each year of schooling supposedly augments income by the same amount.
This is tantamount to saying that "degree stations" do not have any
independent influence on earnings.

Furthermore, using education as a

continuous variable makes it difficult to determine whether or not
employers use the high school diploma as a screening device in order to
restrict entry into better paying, more attractive occupations.
In either the continuous or dummy variable form, no attempt is made
to take into account the quality of education, although one would naturally
expect to find schools of different quality throughout the New England area.
Here again, I feel graduation status to be superior to years of schooling
completed, in that employers who use the high school diploma as a screening
device are less apt to differentiate workers according to where they
attended high school.
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According to dual labor theory, we should expect graduation status
to be a significant and important explicator of earnings in the primary
sector.

Primary market employers often use graduation status as one of

the requirements for employment.

The "diploma effect" in the primary

market should be reflected in considerably higher earnings for those
workers who have completed at least twelve years of formal education.
Traditional theory explains higher earnings for high school graduates as
the monetary returns to investing in higher education.

Beyond high

school, the decision to forestall entering the labor market is grounded
in the belief that future earnings will more than compensate for the
earnings foregone by remaining in school.

Put simply, the more educa

tion, the better the chance of getting a high paying primary market
occupation.
Whereas traditional theory holds that all workers should benefit
from increasing their educational attainment, the dualists maintain this
is only the case in the primary labor market.

Thus, graduation status is

not expected to be a significant and important explicator of earnings
in the secondary labor market.

Since educational attainment makes little

difference with respect to performance in secondary jobs, workers in
this sector are not expected to realize any monetary returns to completing
high school.

2

Given the perceived homogeneity of labor power in the

secondary sector, formal education should not serve to increase worker
productivity.

Although this may be more attributable to the nature of

the job than to the worker himself, education is not expected to serve its
accustomed function of increasing the worker's (marginal) productivity and

2

David M. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment (Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath Company, 1972), p.117.

hence his wage.
Potential labor force experience is defined as age, minus years of
schooling completed, minus six.

I feel that this is superior to simply

using age in the model, because the variable as defined equals the num
ber of years in which a person could have been in the labor force in one
or more jobs gaining work experience.

For example, a thirty year old

worker who has completed sixteen years of schooling could have eight
years of work experience under his belt.

If it is assumed that indivi

duals receive training while they are at work, the returns to a year of
0
work experience ( '
aexp— ) can
used as a surrogate to measure the
returns to investment in on-the-job taining.

3

According to the human capital school, experience adds directly to
a worker's "endogenous" (marginal) revenue product, and will therefore
4
exert a positive effect on earnings.
In the present context, only in
the primary labor market should we expect experience to be an important
explicator of earnings.

The presence of internal labor markets charac

terize most primary occupations.

The internal labor market itself is

characterized by mobility clusters which provide a rigid set of institu
tionalized rules and regulations regarding promotional opportunities, sal
ary scales, work rules and seniority.

If we make the reasonable assump

tion that it is to the worker's advantage to remain in, and move up,
along the ranks of his initial mobility cluster, the experience variable
3
Lester C. Thurow, "The Occupational Distribution of the Returns to
Education and Experience for Whites and Negroes" in Federal Programs for
the Development of Human Resources (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic
Committee, 1968), p.270.
4
Barry Allen Bluestone, "The Personal Earnings Distribution: Indivi
dual and Institutional Determinants" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1974), p.33.
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may also be looked at as a proxy for the returns to employment within an
internal labor market.

This view of experience as reflecting institu

tionalized pay increments based (in part) on length of service ^ is
considerably more comprehensive than the usual human capital approach to
experience.

This approach, in addition to on-the-job training, encom

passes returns which may not be directly attributable to an increment in
an individual's human capital.
Labor force experience should not prove an important determinant of
earnings in secondary market jobs.

Secondary jobs, by definition,

require minimal, if any, training and once learned are simply repeated day
in, day out by those performing them.
non-existent

On-the-job training is virtually

it is neither profitable to the employer, since O.J.T.

will not increase productivity, nor to the employee, since O.J.T. will
not lead to higher wages.

Thus, "experience" should not result in

increasing the value of human capital and earnings to workers trapped in
the secondary sector.

The longer a person has been in the secondary

sector, the better his knowledge may be regarding employment opportunities
(the "best" of the "worst"). However, since wages are uniformly low, even
knowledge concerning where the better jobs are should not have any impor
tant influence on earnings.
Vocational training is the third human capital variable included in
the earnings model.

The importance of vocational training is debatable.

Human capital theorists argue that participation in a vocational training
program increases the value of a worker's human capital, and therefore
his desirability to employers, which should result in a positive impact
on earnings.

5Ibid.

Labor market segmentation theorists counter that within the
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secondary labor market vocational training is superfluous with respect
to the requirements of secondary jobs, and that employers have no incen
tive to pay workers who may have had some vocational training any more
than they pay those who have none.

Even within the primary sector,

uncertainty exists as to the influence of vocational training on earnings.
Since pay scales in many internal labor markets are set by collective
bargaining agreements or some other similar institutional arrangement,
prior (to employment)completion of a vocational training program may not
have any independent effect on earnings.

Whether or not vocational

training increases the probability of primary market employment is
another matter which will be taken up in the second model.
Vocational training includes those persons reporting to have parti
cipated in a vocational training program either in high school, as an
apprentice, in a school of business, nursing or trades, technical insti
tute, or armed forces.^
I have included "class of worker" in order to see the extent to
which earnings in either the primary or secondary labor market are
determined by employment in the private and public sector.

Again, given

the assumptions of dual labor theory, in the secondary sector class of
worker should not prove to be a significant explicator of earnings.
Private sector primary workers, on the other hand, are expected to have
considerably higher earnings than their counterparts in the public sector.
In both the primary and secondary labor market, the coefficient on
weeks worked is expected to be positive and significant.

In the secondary

sector, given the presumed absence of the human capital variables as

^U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970 Census Users' Guide Part I (Bureau
of the Census: U.S. Goverment Printing Office, 1970), p.17.
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explicators of earnings, weeks worked should serve to be the singular
most important determinant of earnings.

Since workers are perceived to

be homogeneous commodities, and since wages are uniformly low throughout
the secondary labor market, annual earnings should depend entirely on
the amount of time (number of weeks) a worker spent on one or more jobs
during the year.
In the primary labor market, whether or not a worker was employed
full or part time will naturally influence earnings.

But earnings

should also vary systematically according to the human capital variables
included in the model.

Thus, a full time worker possessing a high school

diploma and, say, ten years of "experience" should earn more than a
similarly situated worker possessing less than ten years of experience.
In the secondary market, by comparison, earnings are not expected to
show any systematic variation with respect to any of the independent
variables except for weeks worked.
Probability of Primary Employment
The second model to be tested is a two equation model, the purpose
of which is to determine the relative importance of a worker's labor
market status five years ago, as an explicator of his current labor
market status.

This model closely follows the one used by Samuel Rosenberg

in his study of factors which influence a person’s current labor market
status in four low wage labor markets.^

The model may be specified as

^Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and
Consequences" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1975), pp.84-86.
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follows:
I.

PR (Pri) = a + a.HSG + a_VocT + a0Class + a.Mar + acE, +
o
1
2
3
4
5 1
a6E2 + a7E3+ W

II.

Pr (Prl) = a + a.HSG + a_VocT + a.Class + a.Mar + acE. +
o
1
2
3
k
5 1

afiE2 + A^Eg + agOccup65 + v
where:
Prl = 1 if current job Is in the primary labor market;
0 if secondary.
HSG = 1 if high school graduate; 0 if less than 12 years
formal education.
VocT = 1 if respondent participated in a vocational training
program; 0 if not.
Class = 1 if current job is in the private sector; 0 if in
the public sector.
Mar =

1

if

currently married, spouse present; 0ifnot married.

E^ =

1

if

potential labor

force experience (DPFE)is less

than or equal to 10 years; 0 if otherwise.
E2 = 1 if PLFE is greater than or equal to 21 but less than
or equal to 30, 0 if otherwise.
Eg =
Occupgg =

1
1 if

if

PLFE is greater
job in 1965 was

than 31.
in the primary labormarket; 0 if

in the secondary labor market.
In this model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable.

Johnston

explains the logic behind dummy dependent variable models as follows:
...(the dummy) dependent variable takes on only
two values, so that we may use unity to indicate
the occurrence of the event and zero to indicate
its non occurrence. If we run a multiple regres
sion of such a dependent variable Y on several
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explanatory variables X, then we may interpret the
calculated value of Y, for any given X, as an
estimate of the conditional probability of Y, given
X•
Thus the calculated value of "pri" for any given vector of explana
tory variables will tell us the probability of current employment in a
primary labor market occupation.
Explanation of Variables
Graduation status is included, since it is generally held that the
higher one's educational attainment, the greater the chances are of
securing a primary market occupation.

In the present context, a signi

ficant positive coefficient on HSG would indicate that a high school
graduate is more likely to be employed in the primary labor market than
a non-graduate.

This is especially true, given the fact that many

primary employers use the high school diploma as a screening device in
their hiring practices.

The expected relationship would therefore indi

cate the existence of the "diploma" effect as an important selection
criterion which serves to restrict entry into the primary labor market.
A strong positive coefficient on VocT would indicate that partici
pation in a vocational training program enhances the probability of
primary market employment.

VDcational training programs are considered

a major factor in increasing the potential productivity of labor market
entrants, thereby improving their relative position on the employment
queue along which primary employers hire.

A significant non-positive

coefficient on this variable would indicate that job training does not
increase the probability of gaining access to a primary occupation. Such

J. Johnston, Econometric Methods Second Edition (New York: McGraw
Hill Book Co., 1972), p.183.
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a result would necessitate a careful re-evaluation of the entire struc
ture of vocational and job training programs.
Marital status is included, on the assumption that marriage "forces"
a worker to adopt a more stable lifestyle which is conducive to employ
ment in the primary sector.

Primary employers may prefer married workers,

on the grounds that family responsibilities provide greater assurance
that the worker will remain with the firm and conform to the requirements
thereof, in order to maintain a steady flow of income.

Furthermore,

Andrisani claims, "inclusion of marital status provides a crude measure
of the value employers place on marital status as a sign of maturation."

g

On this basis, a positive coefficient on marital status is to be
expected, although it remains to be seen whether or not it will prove a
significant factor in determining the probability of primary employment.
Potential labor force experience is included here as a set of dummy
variables grouped in ten year intervals.

The human capital approach to

PLFE would be to treat it as general training which develops a set of
productive abilities a worker can apply to any job.^

Then, the longer

a worker has been developing his productive abilities, the greater the
likelihood that he will be located in a high paying (primary) occupation.
According to segmentation theory, the above relationship between
experience and occupation holds only within the primary labor market.
Given the constraints of the secondary labor market, experience does not
serve to equip workers with either higher incomes or, more importantly,
provide them with productive abilities necessary to get better jobs, i.e.,
to function in the primary labor market.

For workers already in the

9

Paul James Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market
Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), pp.47-48.
^Gary S. Becker, Human Capital Second Edition (New York: National
Burea for Economic Research, 1975), pp.19-20.
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primary market, experience increases income, as outlined in the previous
model.

Thus, from a dualist viewpoint, the role of PLFE is internalized

within the primary labor market and therefore should not be a sifnificant
determinant of the probability of obtaining a primary market occupation.
The preceding variables are part of a worker's human capital.

The

purpose of the first regression model in this section is to see the
extent to which these variables explain a worker's "current labor market
standing".

By adding "occup^,." to the model, a major facet of dual labor

theory will be tested, namely the contention that once a person finds
himself in either the primary or the secondary labor market, the chances
are he is going to remain there for his entire working career.

11

A

significant positive coefficient on "occup^,." would indicate the impor
tance of worker’s earlier labor market standing on his current sector of
employment.

Concommitantly, the explanatory power of the latter model

should be considerably greater than the model which includes only the
human capital variables.
A nonsignificant or negative coefficient on "occup

03

damaging to the proponents of dual labor market analysis.

'' would be quite
Such a result

would mean that the probability of a worker being in the primary labor
market does not depend on whether or not the worker was in the primary
market at an earlier stage in his working career.

The argument that

work history figures predominantly in current labor market standing would
suffer a sizable loss of validity.

■^Unfortunately, the data source used in this study does not allow
us to test the "strict" dualist proposition that a worker's "first job
^
in the labor force...should predict the sector in which he presently works"
12
13
See Rosenberg
for a similar model which uses first job in lieu of
sector of employment five years ago.
13
Rosenberg, pp,84-87.
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Mobility
The third model examines the probability of upward, secondary to
primary, mobility from 1965 to 1970.

A dummy dependent variable is

regressed against a vector of binary variables, in order to determine
the conditional probability of upward mobility.

The equation may be

specified as follows:
MOB = a + 3,1150 + a0VocT + a_Class + a.Mar + a_E. + a,E_ + a^E„ + p
O

X

b

j

^

j

x

o /

/

j

where:
MOB = 1 if occupation in 1965 was in the secondary sector AND occupation
in 1970 is in the primary sector; 0 if occupation in 1965 was in
the secondary sector AND occupation in 1970 is in the secondary
sector.

(Independent variables remain as defined in the probability

of primary employment model.)
Movement from the secondary to the primary sector, according to dual
theory, is largely restricted to periods of high aggregate demand which
tighten the primary market, forcing employers to either subcontract
production into the secondary market or grant "temporary low level
primary status" to secondary workers.

Since the period under considera

tion was one of rapidly rising aggregate demand (low unemployment), we
might expect to find a considerable amount of mobility.

It must be

remembered that once aggregate demand subsides, most, if not all, of
those temporary primary workers will find themselves out of work and
back in the secondary labor market.
The crux of the mobility issue, in terms of this model and dual
theory in general, lies not in temporary primary positions during periods
of rising aggregate demand, but in terms of what, if any, worker charac
teristics enhance the possibility of moving from secondary jobs to primary
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occupations.

Are there any factors, human capital or otherwise, which

systematically function to increase the probability of upward mobility?
If there exists a sort of queue of secondary workers leading to primary
employment,

14

then we might expect those secondary workers whose human

capital endowments are marginally superior to the majority of the secon
dary labor force to gain access, given the proper economic climate, to
the primary labor market.

In this case, we might expect to find signi

ficant positive coefficients on graduation status, vocational training
and potential labor force experience, all of which can be considered
human capital variables.
A more strict interpretation of the mobility process would maintain
that whatever mobility occurs is purely random, and none of the variables
enumerated above should systematically explain intersectoral mobility.
The two labor markets are virtually separate, and operate under totally
different sets of work rules appropriate to the different composition
of the work force in each sector.

Since the structure of the secondary

market is inconducive to the development of primary work traits, and
since the secondary work force is a homogeneous commodity, it follows
that mobility will be practically nonexistent, occurring merely by chance.
Mobility may be explained in terms of a primary employer pointing
and saying, "I'll take you, you and you," as he views a mass of undif
ferentiated secondary laborers.

Thus, we should not expect statistically

significant positive coefficients on our vector of independent variables.

14
Peter B. Doeringer and Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets and
Manpower Analysis. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971),
pp.177-178.

CHAPTER V

REGRESSION RESULTS
Earnings Model
The regression results for the earnings models are presented and
discussed in this section.

As noted in the previous chapter, the purpose

of this model is to observe whether or not certain variables systemati
cally influence annual earnings within and across the primary and secon
dary labor markets.

I begin by presenting the results for the runs on

the two labor markets, starting with the primary market.
The regression results for the primary market earnings model are
given in Table 1.

As expected, earnings were found to vary systemati

cally with respect to educational attainment (graduation status), potential
labor market experience, weeks worked and class of worker.

The rather

-2

low R indicates that a substantial amount of the variation in earnings is
not explained in the context of the model.

The correlation coefficient in

this model and in those that follow, however, does fall within the range of
those obtained in most earnings/labor market regression models.'*' Rather
than trying to augment the explanatory power of the model as a whole, I
feel it is more important to explain the economic importance of the included
variables.

As M. Dutta points out, "...there is often misdirected emphasis
2

on obtaining a high value of R

-2

(or R )...If the hypothesis based on a priori

1

2

For additional illustrations of the range of the R term in labor market
models, see the empirical sections in Andrisani, Bluestone, Osterman and
Rosenberg cited earlierj Also see the J.P.E. Vol.80, No.3, Part II, May/June
1972 cited in Osterman.
2

Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation" in
Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July 1975), p.519.
67

68

TABLE 1
Earnings Model

PRIMARY LABOR MARKET
Dependent variable:

Annual Earnings

8
Constant
HSG

S. E.

-62.673
39.383a

3.546

"Exp"

0.657a

0.164

Wks

2.236a

0.259

VocT

- 4.645

Class

19.5373

R2adj

0.128

F

44.924

SE

58.823

N

Significant at 0.005 level

1499.

3.161
4.306

2

economic theory is adequately tested, a low value of R

-2

(or R ) is not

so bad."^
The strong significant coefficient on HSG indicates that high school
graduates fare considerably better in terms of earnings than non-graduates.
The almost $4000 per year earnings differential attributable to graduation
status tells us that within the primary sector the better paying jobs
are reserved for those persons having at least a high school diploma.

This

finding provides additional support for the dualist contention that the
"diploma effect" remains a strong entrance requirement for access to many
primary labor market occupations.
Potential labor market experience was also found to be a significant
explicator of primary market earnings.

Assuming this variable measures the

marginal returns to employment in an internal labor market, a worker's
earnings increase systematically as he moves up through the ranks of his
initial mobility cluster.

These returns are undoubtedly reflected in

institutionalized wage and salary and promotional opportunities common to
internal labor markets, in addition to the effect of experience and on-thejob training on worker productivity.
Primary market workers employed in occupations in the primate sector
had considerably higher earnings than their counterparts in public sector
occupations.

Given the relatively secure nature of higher level primary

public sector occupations, it is possible that the significance of this
variable serves to measure the extent of the trade-off between higher
earnings (private sector) and greater job security (public sector).
Bennett Harrison notes there are important non-wage benefits uniquely
associated with public employment, including virtually automatic tenure
3
M. Dutta, Econometric Methods (Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western
Publishing Co., 1975), p.82.
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and secular job stability.

4

One need not look too far into primary public

sector employment (e.g., postal, civil service) to see the extent to which
the internal structure of the labor market provides for job security and
defined mechanisms for layoffs, promotions, pay scales, etc.
Earnings in the primary market were not significantly influenced by
prior participation in a vocational training program.

Caution should be

taken as to the interpretation of this result, since the role of vocational
training may be deemed more appropriate to the development of worker
characteristics suitable to primary market employment.

At the initial

port of entry into a primary market occupation, those workers who have
had vocational training may place higher on an employment queue than those
without training.

Once initial hiring decisions are made, however, the

functioning of the internal mobility cluster takes over regarding pay
increments.

Thus it would be premature to make any definitive statements

as to the function of vocational training in the context of dual labor
theory.
The overall results of the primary market regression model substan
tiate many of the basic propositions of segmented labor market theory.
This is not to say, however, that the results refute the human capital
school.

That primary market earnings were found to vary systematically

according to a worker's stock of human capital should not surprise either
the dualists or the human capital theorists.
If we put our regression model in fuctional form
EARN = f(Human Capital, Weeks Worked, Class)
and differentiate earnings with respect to human capital, i.e., 9Earn/8H.C.,
4

Bennett Harrison, "Public Sector Jobs and the Disadvantaged" in
Manpower and Employment: A Source Book for Social Workers, ed. Margaret
Purvine (New York: Council on Social Work Education, Inc., 1972), p.47.
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the partial will be greater than zero.
to traditional theory.

This result, f' _ >0, is basic
ri • L .

It is also consistent with dual theory, providing

we restrict the analysis to the primary labor market.

Although causation

and methodologies may differ, once a worker finds himself in the primary
labor market, the rival theories stand in basic agreement as to the pre
dicted returns to human capital factors.
When the focus is shifted to the secondary labor market, the expected
returns from increasing a worker's stock of human capital differ consi
derably.

Not recognizing the existence of segmented labor markets, the

human capital theorists claim 8Earn/3H.C.>0 for all workers, while the
dualists maintain in the secondary market f'

n • C* •

=0.

Since this distinction

is vital in comparing the two theories, I will now discuss the empirical
findings for the secondary market, paying close attention to the effect of
human capital on worker earnings.
The regression results for the secondary sector earnings regression
are presented in Table 2.

For persons employed at secondary market jobs,

only weeks worked exerted any systematic influence on earnings.

None of

the other variables proved to be significant determinants of earnings.
_2
The R term was lower in this model than in the preceding one, indi
cating a somewhat greater degree of randomness in the earnings determina
tion process in the secondary sector.

Finding greater randomness in

earnings determination in the secondary sector is supportive of the dual
labor theory, in that individual worker characteristics are claimed to
have no systematic influence on earnings.

Since wages are uniformly low

throughout the secondary sector and an abundant supply of labor power is
readily available, factors which are conventionally used to explain varia
tion in earnings fail to do so.

Osterman also found that the explanatory

power of his model increased for runs on the primary market, although
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TABLE 2
Earnings Model
SECONDARY LABOR MARKET

Dependent variable:

Annual Earnings

A

8
Constant

S.E.

-17.825

HSG

9.534

6.126

"Exp"

0.429

0.278

Wks

1.4253

0.352

VocT

- 8.930

6.936

Class

2.317

7.710

R2adj

0.102

F

5.077

S.E.

35.124

N

Significant at 0.005 level

180.
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comparability is difficult, since he subdivided the primary labor market
into an upper and lower tier.'*

Andrisani's wage determination model, on

the other hand, experienced a sharp decline in explanatory power for runs
on the primary sector as opposed to the secondary sector.
adjusted R

2

In fact, the

for his primary whites-only model (the one most comparable to
_2

that used here) was only slightly more than half the R

attained in the

£
secondary market.

According to Andrisani's model, worker differences are

important in explaining earnings determination in the secondary labor
market.

Thus, in terms of correlation coefficients, the results obtained

here, along with Osterman's, are more supportive of dual labor theory than
those obtained by Andrisani.
That none of the human capital variables turned out to be signifi
cant with respect to earnings lends still further credence to dual labor
market analysis.

A basic proposition of the dual theory is that within

the secondary market, employers do not distinguish between workers with
respect to age, race, sex, etc.

The relations of production in the

secondary sector are such that educational status, years in the labor
force and vocational training do not increase worker productivity, and as
a result are uncorrelated with earnings.

Labor power is, in fact, viewed

as a homogeneous commodity, in that all workers look alike to the secon
dary employer and are readily interchangable.
Given the severe test conditions under which this model was estimated
(i.e., tight labor market period, no racial distinctions, etc.), it is
surprising to find results even more supportive of strict dual theory than
in some earlier empirical endeavors.

Andrisani, for example, found that in

^Osterman. p.518.
£
Paul James Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market
Theory (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.82.
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both sectors, dropping out of school(not graduating high school) had an
adverse effect on wage rates, while age, used as a proxy for labor market
exposure, significantly contributed to earnings.7 These results are men
tioned because they are supportive of the competing human capital queue
theory of the labor market, while my results refute the traditional theory.
Potential labor market experience did not serve to increase secondary
earnings.

Since most secondary jobs take very little time to learn and

once learned worker prodictivity plateaus, there is no need for any sort
of continuing on-the-job training programs.

Furthermore, given the

absence of internal labor markets in secondary jobs, no institutionalized
mechanisms exist which specify earnings increment, promotional oppor
tunities and/or collective bargaining agreements.

The employer is simply

indifferent with respect to the age composition of his work force.

Since

training programs are virtually nonexistent, and since years in the labor
force do not systematically increase earnings, workers in secondary jobs
receive the same income regardless of experience (age).

Thus, an experience/

earnings profile for secondary labor market workers in New England would
take the following form:

Earnings

Experience, Years in Labor Force
Neither participation in a vocational training program nor employment
in the private sector contributed to earnings in the secondary market.
Both of these results are consistent with dual labor theory in that (a) the
nature of secondary jobs renders vocational preparation superfluous,

7Ibid.

p.81.
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(b) earnings are uniformly low for all secondary jobs, and (c) the secondary
labor process does not distinguish public sector low wage, skill level,
etc., occupations from those located in the private sector.
As stated above, only weeks worked was found to be a significant
explicator of earnings.

David Gordon's contention that in the "secondary

market individual income will depend primarily on the (amount of time)
worked while variations in individual earnings will depend very little on
g

variations in individual capacities..."

is strongly substantiated, given

the results of the present model.
Probability of Primary Employment Model
The results of the probability of primary labor market employment model
are given in Tables 3 and 4.

As discussed in the previous chapter, this is

a two equation model of the form:
7
y, = a + £ a.x.+ u
1
o ., x x
x=l
7
Y„ = a+ Z a.x. + ao0ccup-r +
2
o ., x x
8
65
x=l

u

where the estimated value of the dependent variable (y) is interpreted as
the conditional probability of employment in the primary labor market.
x/s are defined as a vector of human capitalvariables, the purpose
which

is to determine the extent to which thesevariables explain

current labor market standing.

The

of

aworker's

In the second equation, sector of employment

(primary or secondary) five years ago is added to the human capital variables,
in order to test the dual hypothesis that a worker's earlier labor market

g

Mass.:

David M. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment (Lexington,
D. C. Heath and Co., 1972), p.51.
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standing should serve to predict the sector in which the worker is currently
employed.
So that I may avoid repeated use of the somewhat cumbersome titles
given to the above models, the first will be referred to as the "current"
model while the second one (which includes Occup^,.) will simply be called
the "augmented" model.

I will begin by discussing the results of the

current model, and then compare them with the estimates derived from the
augmented model.
_2

The coefficient of correlation (R adj) for the current model turned out
to be quite low (only 4.6 percent), indicating that factors not captured in
the model may account for a sizable amount of the variation in the depen
dent variable.

Nevertheless, two of the independent variables, graduation

status and vocational training, were found to systematically affect the
probability of employment in the primary market.

A one tail T test on

these two variables revealed them to be different from zero at the 0.005
9
level of significance.
From Table 3, it can be seen that the probability of securing a job
in the primary labor market is significantly greater for high school
graduates than for drop outs.

Although it may be argued that at least a

high school diploma is a necessary prerequisite for many primary market
occupations, this is clearly not the case for all occupations which have
been classified as primary occupations.^
9
One tail T tests were used since the hypothesis tested is that gradu
ation status and vocational training are positively associated with the
chances of primary market employment.
10

A series of tables which list the census Classified Index of Occupa
tions and estimates of required general educational development can be .
found in James Scoville, The Job Content of the U.S. Economy 1940-1970.
Inspection of these tables shows the vast majority of occupations require
less than 12 years of schooling.
11

James G. Scoville, The Job Content of the U.S. Economy 1940-1970
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1969), p.30.

TABLE 3
Probability of Primary Market Employment
"Current" Model
Dependent variable:

Pr(Pri)

g

S.E.

Constant

0.780

HSG

0.1053

0.017

VocT

0.0673

0.016

Class

0.018

0.022

Mar

0.013

0.056

El

-0.001

0.023

E2

0.005

0.020

E3

-0.034

0.022

R2adj

0.045

F

11.714

SE

0.300

N

Significant at 0.005 level

1576.

Access to the primary market is strongly influenced by graduation status,
indicating that the diploma remains an important credentialing device used
by employers in their hiring decisions.

This supports segmentation theory,

in that the use of educational credentials provides a quick and allegedly
inexpensive device for screening out socially undesirable individuals.

12

Since a major function of the educational system is to teach future workers
how to behave and fit into the production process, employers, by screening
out high school dropouts, ensure themselves of a stable "well" conditioned
work force.^
Participation in a vocational training program was also found to
increase the likelihood of employement in the primary labor market.

Voca

tional training programs, in addition to teaching (hopefully) marketable
skills, stress behavioral modifications (such as punctuality) deemed neces
sary prerequisites for employment in primary occupations, but of no value in
the secondary market, given the structure and nature of employment therein.
Although statistically significant, this result should not be used to throw
whole-hearted support to the structure of vocational training programs in
New England.

Enrollment in a training program only increased the probability

of primary employment by approximately six and one-half percent.

In this

light, I would recommend a cost/benefit analysis of vocational training pro
grams in the New England area to see whether or not this six and one-half
percent increase in the probability of primary employment justifies main
taining existing training programs.
12

Bennett Harrison, Education, Training and the Urban Ghetto (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1972), p.30.
13
See S. Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America for a
detailed discussion of the role of education in the labor process.

Neither marital status nor employment in the private sector served to
increase a worker's chances of gaining access to a primary market occupation.
Finding marital status insignificant forces me to question Piore's hypothesis
that marriage and family formation increases a worker's stability, thereby
making him more condusive to employment in the primary sector.

A word of

caution is in order, in that this result may be attributed more to the fact
that the New England model is not restricted to urban labor markets where
the "street corner lifestyle" prohibits both stable marriage and the develop
ment of work characteristics, thereby trapping workers in the secondary
labor market.

14

It may well be the case that in non-urban labor markets,

secondary workers exhibit stable marital patterns even though secondary job
structures do not provide much stability.
The likelihood of employment in the primary labor market did not vary
systematically with labor market experience.

Workers with limited market

exposure were just as likely to be in the primary market as were workers who
had been in the labor market for upwards of twenty years.

This supports

the hypothesized relationship between experience and probability of primary
employment, in that workers whose market exposure has been in the secondary
sector are not provided with increases in productive abilities which would
act to increase their chances of gaining a slot in the primary sector.

For

workers whose PLFE has been in the primary market, experience, as the results
of the first model indicate, increases income via the institutionalized
structure of the internal labor market.
Turning to the "augmented" model, (Table 4) we find that the inclusion
of Occupg^ results in a sharp reduction of the unexplained variance and

14
Elliot Leibow, Tally's Corner (Boston:
chapter 2.

Little, Brown and Co., 1967)
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TABLE 4
Probability of Primary Employment
"Augmented" Model

Dependent variable: Pr(Pri)
8

S.E.

Constant

0.0356

HSG

0.046a

0.015

VocT

0.035a

0.013

Class

0.007

0.018

Mar

0.008

0.046

El

-0.009

0.019

E2

-0.001

0.016

E3

-0.027

0.018

Occupg^

0.549a

0.021

R2adj

0.342

F

103.436

SE

0.249

N

Significant at 0.005 level

1576.
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consequently, a much higher coefficient of correlation.

Occup^ exerts

a positive significant effect on current market standing, accounting for
more than half the conditional probability of employment in the primary
labor market.

The importance of labor market status five years ago as a

determinant of current status suggests the viability of the dualist position
that once a person finds himself in the primary (secondary) labor market,
he will more than likely spend the remainder of his working career in the
primary (secondary) labor market.
Graduation status and vocational training were also significant explicators of primary employment in the augmented model.

However, the relative

importance of these two variables declined in the latter model.

Graduation

from high school increased the probability of primary employment by ten
and one-half percent in the current model, but only by four and six-tenths
percent in the augmented model; whereas participation in a vocational train
ing program increased the likelihood of primary employment six and seventenths percent in the first model, but only three and one-half percent in
the second.

This suggests there may be interaction between Occup^,. and one

or more of the remaining independent variables included in the model.
In order to test for the existence and severity of multicollinearity,
I used a test developed by D. E. Farrar and R. R. G l a u b e r . M . Dutta
explains the test as follows:
...estimate the multiple correlation coefficient
of a particular independent variable, x^> with
respect to all other members of the x set and
denote this by
To test whether x is seriously
collinear with the other X's, form the ratio:

^D, E. Farrar and R. R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression
Analysis: The Problem Revisited" in Review of Economics and Statistics
(Vol.XLIX, February 1967), pp.92-107.
■^Dutta.

p.153.
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K

R

>1

y

where R is the correlation coefficient as estimated for
the multiple regreggion.^
Regressing Occupy against the remaining x's yielded an Rx^ of 0.044.
Forming the required ratio:
Rx,
= 0.044/0.346 < 1

R
y

we see that multicollinearity is not a serious problem.

Thus, Occup^

exerts a strong independent influence on current labor market standing.
Mobility Model
The regression results for the probability of upward mobility model
are given in Table 5.

This model is a dichotomous dependent variable

model of the form:
7
y = a + £ a.x. + u
o

. .

i=l

1 1

where y takes on a value of one if the respondent was employed in the
secondary labor market in 1965 and in the primary market in 1970, and a
value of zero if he was in the secondary market in 1965 and 1970.

The

x^'s were defined as a vector of human capital and control variables.
2

As in the previous models, the adjusted R

is somewhat low; only

ten and six-tenths percent of the variation in mobility is explained by
the independent variables.

However, several of the independent variables

do exert a systematic influence on the likelihood of upward mobility.

In

addition, the computed F statistic is greater than the critical value

(fj -].61^ ’ so t*iat we can re3ect null hypothesis that a^ = a^ = 0.
Graduation status did not turn out to be a significant explicator of
upward mobility, in that high school graduates were no more likely to be
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TABLE 5
Upward Mobility Model

Dependent variable:

MOB
A

S.E.

Constant

e
0.441

HSG

0.096

0.080

VocT

0.149c

0.089

Class

-0.051

0.104

Mar

0.045

0.241

El

0.023

0.127

E2

-0.072

0.096*

E3

-0.332a

0.095

R2adj

0.106

F

3.868

SE

0.462

N

significant at 0.005 level
^significant at 0.01 level
c

significant at 0.05 level

171.

upwardly mobile than were nongraduates.

This result is particularly

damaging to traditional/human capital theory, since proponents of orthodox
theory have continually stressed the role of formal education as a means
by which workers can escape from the confines of low paying, low status
secondary type jobs.

Finding graduation status insignificant, on the

other hand, suggests the viability of the dualist position that secondary
workers are "locked into" their low level positions, and increasing human
capital endowments of these workers will not serve to increase their
chances of upward labor market mobility.
Although the coefficient on HSG does lend itself to an interpretation
favorable to segmented labor market theory, a word or two of caution is in
order.

As explained earlier, the data only accounts for mobility between

1965 and 1970.

Since the respondents completed their formal education

prior to 1965, there is no way to ascertain the function of formal educa
tion in the distribution of first job selection.

It may well be the case

that educational attainment figures decisively in the determination process
on the basis of the results obtained here.
Turning to vocational training, we find participation in a vocational
training program does act to increase the probability of upward mobility.
A one tail T test shows the coefficient on VocT to be significant at the
0.05 level.

Hence, a worker in the secondary sector in 1965 who has had

some formal training is almost fifteen percent more likely to be upwardly
mobile than a similarly situated worker with no vocational training.

This

result, in contrast to that for education, is at odds with dual theory and
supportive of the rival human capital theory.

According to the dualists,

the relations of production in the secondary labor market are inconducive
to vocational training, i.e., the jobs do not require it and workers do not
receive any monetary returns from it.

Thus, workers in the secondary market
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should have no incentive to undertake vocational training if it doesn't
result in monetary payoffs and if they believe they don't have access to
primary jobs.

The human capital school, in contrast, argues that vocational

training increases the primary "employability" of secondary workers.

In

addition to teaching a primary marketable skill, vocational training pro
grams also expose workers to the rigor and behavioral characteristics
deemed prerequisites to entrance into a primary market occupation.

As a

consequence of such training and exposure, those in the program move
upward on the employment queue, thereby gaining access to the primary
market.

Quite simply, vocational training differentiates secondary workers,

increasing their productivity and desirability to primary employers.
The results obtained here tend to substantiate the latter approach to
the role of training programs.

Although this appears on the surface to

conflict with the results obtained elsewhere which favor a dualist inter
pretation, it should be tempered by the realization that VocT was, at best,
marginally significant.

Looking at the model was a whole, it is safe to

say that the mobility process is marked by a sizable amount of randomness
and it is difficult to make any precise statements as to what, if any,
factors serve to explain intersectoral mobility.
Several additional comments on the coefficients on this model are in
order.

The coefficient on E3 (30 or more years of experience) turned out

to be significant at the 0.005 level.

This is interesting, in that it

denotes a strong inverse relationship between years in the secondary labor
market and the probability of upward mobility.

This strongly favors our

hypothesized relation between experience and mobility, in that the longer
a person has been subjected to the unstructured relations of production in
the secondary market, the more ingrained the "negative" behavioral traits
associated therein become.

The continued exposure to secondary working

conditions thus reduces the likelihood of a worker escaping these con
fines and getting a primary job.

The significant negative coefficient on E3

simply indicates that the chances of mobility diminish over time.
In order to further test the inverse relationship between chances of
mobility and years in the labor force, the model was run a second time
with experience as a continuous variable.

The results were similar to those

in Table 5 (VocT significant at 0.05, HSG, Class, etc., insignificant),
except now the coefficient on experience equals -0.015 and tested signifi
cant at the 0.005 level.

This is interesting, in that it tells us that a

secondary worker's chances of upward mobility decline by one and one-half
percent each year he is in the secondary labor market.
An overall evaluation of the mobility model raises several important
questions and problems.

Some of the coefficients suggest the viability

of segmented labor market theory, while others support traditional theory.
That the mobility process is marked by a substantial amount of randomness,
and that educational attainment does not increase the probability of upward
mobility can be readily interpreted from a dualist perspective.

17

On the

other hand, the data indicate that mobility takes place to an extent that
renders a strict interpretation of dual theory (market boundaries are vir
tually impenetrable) a severe set back.

In fact, of those persons whose

reported 1965 occupation was classified as secondary, better than onethird reported 1970 occupations which were in the primary labor market.

I

am at a loss to provide a satisfactory explanation for the mobility that
does take place.

This indicates that (1) factors endemic to the data make

17
The basic mobility model was respecified using education as a
continuous variable. It still turned out not to be significant with
respect to mobility.
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accounting for mobility impossible or (2) despite the estent of mobility,
it remains truly "an accident" of chance, e.g., being in the right place
at the right time.

Perhaps the best explanation is that 1965 to 1970 was

an historical period of rapid G.N.P. growth, falling unemployment rates and
the induction of thousands of young men into the military.
This concludes the empirical chapters of my thesis.

In the following

chapters the emphasis shifts from econometric models to a case study of the
labor market in Manchester, New Hampshire.

The purpose of the case study

is to gather direct evidence concerning the extent to which internal labor
markets function in the state's largest and most industrious city.

The

results of the case study will then be used in conjunction with the empirical
findings, in order to gain a clearer understanding of the labor market seg
mentation process in New England.

CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY:

THE MANCHESTER LABOR MARKET

In this chapter, I present the results of a case study of the labor
market in Manchester, New Hampshire.

Through the cooperation of the

Center for Industrial and Institutional Development (CUD) of the
Whittemore School of Business and Economics and the Manchester Industrial
Council, I was able to gain access to several of the city's largest foot
wear, electronics and textile producing companies.
selected partly because

These industries were

represent two cases (textile and shoe) of what

may be called declining industries, and one (electronics) which is a
growth industry.

Furthermore, in terms of employment these are the three

largest manufacturing industries in Manchester.
three from 1970-1975 is given in Table 6.

Total employment in the

Despite the severe downturn

in electronics employment during the 1975 recession, state projections
indicate "the primary sources of new jobs in durable goods manufacturing
from 1974-1985...should be electrical machinery products industries.

One

out of every five projected new jobs for the Manchester SMSA will be in
this electrical machiner sector."'*' The declines in the other two sectors
are expected to continue through the 1980's.
In order to find information concerning the structure of the labor
market from which these industries draw their manpower, a two-part, semi
open ended questionnaire was developed.

Managerial personnel, primarily

New Hampshire Department of Employment Security. Occupational
Projections to 1985 Manchester S.M.S.A. (prepared by Economic Analysis
and Reports, Wesley S. Noyes, Jr., Supervisor, June 1977), p.3.
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TABLE 6
Employment by Industrial Group, Manchester, N. H.
(Annual Averages)

Electrical

Textile

Leather and
Leather Products

1970

3,350

2,800

4,900

1971

3,600

3,000

4,600

1972

4,050

3,300

4,350

1973

4,800

3,200

3,500

1974

4,950

2,900

3,000

1975

4,100

1,800

2,850

SOURCE:

New Hampshire Department of Employment Security.
Occupational Prolections to 1985; Manchester,
N.H., SMSA, June, 1977, p.2.
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personnel directors, were interviewed and asked questions concerning (a)
the composition of their labor force, (b) recruitment procedures, (c) the
provisions the company has for worker training, (d) the existence of
avenues of in-firm worker mobility and (e) separation and turnover rates.
The second part of the questionnaire was administered to production workers
in each of the companies visited.

Workers were asked (a) how long they had

been with the company, (b) whether or not they had participated in training
programs, (c) if their current job was different from the one they were
initially hired to perform, (d) the frequency with which they received
either pay increases or promotions, and (e) several questions concerning
their pre-employment history and family background.

Questionnaires were

given to four personnel directors, one vice-president, and approximately
forty wrokers in five companies:
textile.

two footwear, two electronics, and one

See Appendix 2 for copies of the questionnaires.

The intent of this survey was to see if management and labor responses
suggest segmentation within the Manchester labor market.

It will be

recalled from Chapter 2 that employment conditions in the secondary labor
market differ considerably from those in the primary market.

It was also

pointed out that many dualists believe the existence of an internal labor
market with structured mechanisms for the administration of work rules,
seniority, promotions and layoffs, all of which serve to isolate workers
from external market forces, signifies that the occupation is in the pri
mary labor market.

With this in mind, the extent to which we can find

developed internal labor markets in the industries studied may give an
indication as to whether or not the occupations therein are in the primary
labor market.
The methodology I use for reporting observations is as follows:

For
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each of the three industries studied, I first present some observations
based upon discussions with management, and then present observations based
upon worker discussions.

The industries are discussed separately in order

to get as complete a picture as possible of the labor process in each
industry, and also to see if there is any conflict between management’s
responses and those of production workers.

I begin with the footwear

industry, followed by the electronics and textile industries.

The chapter

concludes with an attempt to synthesize the occupational and industrial
characteristics described by workers and management with the dual labor
market theory.
Footwear Industry
Management Responses
According to the personnel directors interviewed, the labor supply
for the footwear industry is drawn from the local labor market, i.e.,
Manchester and the surrounding area.

A large part of the labor force in one

company was said to come from the French Canadian district of the city,
which was within walking distance of the plant.

When recruiting workers,

the companies tended to rely upon three major sources:

walk-ins, word of

mounth (employee referrals), and the local media (newspaper want ads and
radio spots).

Given the unstructured nature of the hiring sources, it

follows that hirees were not subjected to an extensive pre-employment
screening process.

I was told on numerous occasions there were no standard

requirements on which hiring decisions were made.

Education was not con

sidered an important factor, since most of the jobs required medium to low
skill levels.

One personnel manager went so far as to describe his labor

force as comprising "the low end of the. labor market."
Formal, in-house worker training programs were virtually nonexistent
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in any of the footwear plants visited.

Whatever training a new worker

received was attained informally, usually watching someone performing the
job, being shown the basic techniques, and then beginning the job.

Since,

in some cases, payment was by piece-work, it was to the employee's advan
tage to start on the job quickly in order to develop speed.

Management

argued a more extensive training program was really unnecessary, because
most of the jobs required only a short period of time to be learned.
In response to questions concerning avenues of in-firm upward mobility,
personnel directors indicated there were no formal job ladders for pro
duction workers operating in their organizations.

Although most workers

were hired into entry level positions and were said to receive periodic
pay increases (especially in unionized plants), workers generally remained
at the job they were initially hired to perform.

In one case, I was told

that openings in the factory were posted and workers could bid for the
open job.

Whereas Doeringer and Piore consider "bidding and posting" as

factors in an internal market structure,

2

in the present case, relatively

few workers were said to take advantage of bidding.

Those that did seemed

to move horizontally, just to try something different from their current
job.

One manager commented that significant upward mobility was rare, but

a possible line of progression might take the form:

bell boy (assistant

to a machinist), machinist, department manager, factory manager.
Upper level job slots were said to be almost always filled by going
out into the external labor market.

The impression was given that

"insiders" were simply not managerial or supervisory material.

One company

reported to have tried an in-house pre-supervisory training program, but found

2

Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore. Internal Labor Markets and
Manpower Analysis. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971),
p.55.
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internal promotion to be ineffective:

"Standards were below par".

The

company concluded that in order to maintain an acceptable rate of growth,
hiring at mid-level positions and above must be done externally.

In all

cases, upper level positions were said to require academic training.
Obviously, this tends to limit that range of opportunities available to
production workers.
Turnover rates were reported to be in excess of 100 percent per year
in all firms visited.

Although management voiced concern about such a

high rate of turnover, I was told that this was common to this type of
industry.

Turnover was mostly due to workers quitting their jobs.

No

formal exit interviews were conducted, but the major reasons given for
quitting included:

a different (better?) job which either paid slightly

better or had better working conditions, and morale problems such as not
being able to get along with the foreman, supervisor, or co-workers.
None of the personnel directors indicated that their company was planning
to do anything to try to curb the amount of labor turnover.
Worker Responses
Interviews with production workers substantiated most of what
management said regarding the structure and organization of work in this
industry.

Employees interviewed included lining cutters, stitchers,

casers, assemblers and nailers.

Although it was clear that a detailed

division of labor exists in the shoe industry, the differences in the jobs
appeared minimal.

Then cross referenced with the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles, most of the jobs fell in the first and second General Education
Development (GED) level, and the first through third Specific Vocational
Preparation levels.

3

3
G.E.D. level 2 entails applying common sense understanding to carry
out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions and svp level 3
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With very few exceptions, workers were on the same job in which
they initially started employment.

Those who had "moved around" within

the company appeared to have performed the same type of work, but on
different machines.

There was no evidence of an internal labor market.

Workers did say that they had received periodic pay increases, so that
other things being equal, workers with "seniority" earned more than
recent hirees performing the same job.

Since most workers said they

were paid on a piecework basis, incomes, for the most part, depended on
how fast the worker could perform his/her job.
When asked if they had undertaken any formal or informal on-the-job
training since beginning employment, close to sixty percent responded
"no".

Upon further questioning of the "yes" respondents, all admitted

that the extent of their "training" was:

"Following a person around to

learn the ropes", "supervisor saying things", or watching an experienced
worker.

Given the extent and nature of training, it was not surprising

to hear workers say that their training did not lead to either pay in
creases or promotions.
Despite the fact that half of the workers interviewed said they had
less than twelve years of schooling, more than eighty percent felt their
current job did not require the educational background they had.

There

was little evidence of intergenerational upward mobility among footwear
workers.

Of those who remembered, none of their fathers had graduated

from high school, and three-fourths said their father had little more than
a grammar school education.

Furthermore, of the ninety percent who grew

includes up to three months of training.
4

4

U.S. Department of Labor. Selected Characteristics of Occupations,
A Supplement to the D.O.T., 3rd Edition. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1966), pp. A-5, A-6.

95

up in New Hampshire, most said their fathers were employed as shoe and
mill workers in the Manchester area.
Electronics
Management Responses
Recruitment of personnel in the electronics industry operates
on what can be considered a two-tiered system.

Professional and "high

technology" employees are recruited from the national labor market
drawing manpower from Boston, New York, Chicago, etc.
by management to constitute a separate labor market.

This is considered
These employees

were not covered in this survey since my concern is with production level
workers.

For the second tier, assemblers and other production workers,

hiring is usually confined to the greater Manchester labor market.
Oftentimes, recent arrivals to the Manchester area were said to seek
employment in electronics firms.

Aware that electronics is Manchester's

fastest growing industrial sector, personnel directors noted that other
electronics companies were their major source of competition for workers.
In previous years, it was argued, there really was not much competition
for employees, but now employees are aware of wage and benefit packages
of competing firms.
Most of the hiring was said to be done by means of newspaper want
ads, although some indicated they hire from employment security offices,
W.I.N., C.E.T.A. and referrals from current employees.

Hiring decisions

appeared to be somewhat more structured than in the footwear industry.
References were frequently requested and, in some cases, closely checked.
Education levels were looked at but were said not to constitute a basis
for hiring.

It did seem that employers had a preference for high school

graduates and that a screening process operated in entry level hiring decisions.
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All companies reported that in-house worker training programs exist.
However, the extent of the training programs differed quite widely from
plant to plant.

One personnel director stated O.J.T. was simply placing

a new worker with a senior employee.

The senior employee functions as a

group leader, demonstrating whatever techniques hirees need to learn.
Another director elaborated a more detailed in-house training program,
which included a "one week cram program" for assemblers, a machinist
training program, and a series of in-house vestibule schools for learning
soldering and other assembly-related techniques.

Depending upon the

situation, responsibility for training rested on the group leader, the
machine shop supervisor, or the assembler trainer, a person whose job
is to train assembly workers.

Two company representatives stated that

their firm would pay a part of any work-related outside education an
employee undertakes.
Hourly workers were initially hired into entry-level positions as
either assemblers or machinists.

There was some indication of a structured

job sequence in the companies visited.

The degree of market internaliza

tion differed and was found to depend, in part, on whether or not the
company was unionized.

Management in a unionized firm argued that union

influence hindered worker mobility, because the union traps employees into
positions and pay scales as specified in the union contract.

The union

agreement establishes pay increases, seniority and so forth, but makes
promotion out of specified job classifications based upon ability difficult.
In a non-unionized firm, promotion decisions were said to be left up to
the worker’s immediate supervisor.

I was told that the relevant promotion

criteria Included attendance, punctuality, attitude, quality of work,
supervisor’s opinion, and seniority.
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Several different lines of promotion existed, indicating the presence
of internal labor markets in the electronics companies visited.
firm, promotion was from assembly jobs into light clerical.

In one

An example

of such a progression was as follows:
Manager's secretary
Purchasing clerk
Assembler (entry level)
Except for top level positions, those above manager's secretary, every
open job slot was said to be posted and filled from within if at all
possible.
In another firm, there appeared to be a more structured internal
labor market.

Promotion levels were more sharply defined and confined

within the production sphere as indicated:
Supervisory level
Group leader
Skilled production assembler
Production assembler
Entry trainee
Each upward step was considered a promotion and was said to entail an
increase in pay.

As in the previous case, upper level slots were filled

from within, but promotion was based upon selection, as opposed to
bidding and posting.
No specifics were given with regard to the incidence of turnover.
However, rates were said to be lower in the unionized firms than in nonunionized establishments.
to be a serious problem.

On the whole, management did not feel turnover
No formal exit interviews were conducted with
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departing employees, but personnel directors indicated that workers who
leave usually go to another electronics firm that may pay slightly more
or offer more nonwage benefits.
Worker Responses
Most of the people interviewed were working as assemblers.
However, the nature of the assembly work differed considerably from plant
to plant.

In one company, assemblers built each unit from start to finish

(similar to the Volvo production format) while in another, each assembler
only performed a specific task (stuff circuit board with components,
cable assembler, solderer). In response to questions concerning what they
liked best about their jobs, several people in the former said they liked,
"building units from start to finish", "found it challenging", and "got
satisfaction out of seeing a finished product".

In the latter, the

responses were more along the lines of, "I like the people", "it's a nice
place to work", or quite simply, "everything".
Other workers interviewed included quality control inspectors, pres
sure calibrators, and floor

supervisors.

In all cases, these people

started out in entry level positions (assembly) and were promoted from
within the organization.

Although such in-firm upward mobility did indi

cate an internal job allocation process, it appeared that many workers
were not upwardly mobile and were more or less locked into assembly level
positions.

In some cases, assemblers moved about from line to line, since

some assembly lines were claimed to be more attractive than others.

It

was not possible to determine whether or not there was an occupational
hierarchy among assemblers, or what factors determined which assembly station
a worker was assigned to.

There was, however, a greater sense of job

attachment among electronics workers than in the footwear industry.
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Better than eighty percent of the workers Interviewed indicated that
they had received some formal or informal on-the-job training since they
began working.

Of these, approximately sixty percent stated they had

participated in formal, company-run or sponsored training programs, such
as soldering school.

Upon completion of soldering school, workers noted

they were given a "certificate" indicating successful completion of the
course.
In one company, when asked if this training resulted in pay increases
and/or promotions, the uniform response was "no".

This was somewhat

surprising since, according to traditional economic theory, training
increases a worker's human capital, thereby raising his/her marginal pro
ductivity and hence wages.

Management's response was that the union

contract specifies pay scales and positions, and as a result rules out
promotions based upon performance and ability.

Employees receive periodic

pay increases and seniority rights, but these accrue independent of par
ticipation in formal training programs.
Close to seventy-five percent of the electronics workers interviewed
had at least a high school diploma.

All of the employees who had moved out

of assembly level job slots came from this group.

Perhaps this indicates

that although management does not necessarily make a high school diploma
a prerequisite for employment, the diploma greatly enhances the probability
of upward in-firm mobility.

Also, slightly more than half the sample said

they felt their job required the educational background they possessed.
Workers in the electronics industry tended to come from a somewhat
higher socio-economic strata than their counterparts in the footwear
industry,

The education level of their parents was found to be considerably

higher than in the shoe industry, in that only forty percent reported that
their fathers did not attend high school, while forty percent said their
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fathers had at least graduated from high school.

Their fathers' occupa

tions were, for the most part, lower level primary sector:
electronics, sales and retail operators.

construction,

Almost half indicated that they

did not grow up in New Hampshire.
Textile Industry
Management Responses
As in the previous two cases, most of the production workers
resided in Manchester and the surrounding community.

Hiring sources were

more varied than in the shoe and electronics industries.

In addition to

worker referrals, local media, and employment security agencies, a com
pany spokesperson said that if a mill closes somewhere in New England or
Northeastern Canada, they attempt to recruit workers who have recently
lost their jobs.
There did not appear to be an extensive screening process for entry
into the textile industry.

Although the preceding paragraph indicates that

companies will, at times, seek out experienced personnel, no specific men
tion was made of either previous experience or educational prerequisites
for employment.

Pre-employment physicals were said to be given.

Of the three industries surveyed, textiles seemed to have the most
formalized new worker training procedures.

Entry level employees were

said to receive a two-week training program conducted in a vestibule
school.

Successful completion of the program indicated that the worker

was ready to move into a higher level job slot, i.e., entry into a well
defined internal labor market.

Above entry level, training was more

informal and took place on the job.

Usually a senior employee would show

the worker "the ropes".
Virtually all production hourly workers were hired into entry level

positions.

Once in an entry level slot, workers received training which

enabled them to move into the next rung on the job ladder.

Although it

was not made clear who was generally responsible for making promotion
decisions, I was informed that the most important factors influencing
promotion decisions included the "ability to keep up" and learn the re
quired techniques of operating the weaving machinery. Within the "weaving
room" internal labor market, vacancies in upper level job slots were filled
solely by moving workers from the job category immediately preceding the
one in which the vacancy opened. The internal job allocation structure in
one of Manchester’s largest textile companies was described to me as
follows:
Weave Room
Superintendent
Supervisor
Fixer
Changer
Weaver
Unifil tender (entry level)
Each upward step was considered a promotion and entailed an increase in pay.
From unifil tender to fixer there was an approximate pay differential of
fifty cents per hour for each step upward.
Despite the well-defined internal structure of the labor market,
management indicated the turnover rate was high, and felt it to be a
serious problem.

Since the average length of employment of the workers I

spoke with was close to thirty years, it seems likely that turnover is
concentrated among younger workers in either entry or low level positions.
Workers who terminate their employment usually do so because of higher
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pay and/or better working conditions elsewhere.
Worker Responses
The sample consisted of workers performing various tasks in
what was called the "weave room".

As mentioned above, the average dura

tion of employment was upwards of thirty years.
viewees were in entry level positions.

Thus, none of the inter

Although this may bias the sample

by making employment in the textile industry appear more stable than it
actually is, it did provide me with an excellent opportunity to observe
the functioning of an internal labor market.
Most of the workers indicated that they had received some combina
tion of formal training and on-the-job training.

The major emphasis was

on learning by simply watching a more experienced employee performing his/
her job.

Since this type of training was deemed a necessary preprequisite

for mobility, the few who said they had not received any training were
probably discounting learning by watching as a form of training.

In all

cases, those who had received training said their training resulted in both
pay increases and promotions.

Most employees indicated they received pay

increases when they moved up in rank, as well as increases guaranteed in
their union contract.

This is obviously quite different from the unionized

electronics firm where employees stated they received no pecuniary rewards
from undertaking training programs.
Management's depiction of the internal job structure was well docu
mented in the worker interviews.

Virtually all workers began their careers

in what, at the time, were entry level positions.

Due to modernization,

some of the job categories in which workers started employment no longer
exist.

Nevertheless, as the examples below indicate, a great deal of

similarity exists in the mobility patterns of the workers interviewed.
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When asked to enumerate the different jobs they had had since they began
working for the company, several workers responded as follows:
Worker it 2

Worker # 1
Current
Position: Loom fixer

Worker it 3

Unifil fixer

Changer

Changer

Changer

Weaver

Knot tier

Weaver

Battery handler

Leaser

Cloth boy

Peg boy

Battery handler

Entry
Level:

Bobbin boy
Cleaner

Each worker reported that each upward step entailed a salary increase and
was considered a promotion.

According to wage rate information that was

made available to me, fixers earned about $4.50 per hour, changers $4.00
per hour, and weavers $3.90 per hour.

The examples given here are quite

similar to those described by Doeringer and Piore as "closed internal
markets" wherein "all jobs are filled internally through transfer or
upgrading from a single entry job classification".^
In terms of both their educational background and that of their
parents, textile workers were far more similar to footwear workers than
to electronics workers.
graduates.

Very few textile workers where high school

In fact, sixty

percent of those questioned indicated that

they had never attended high school.
even less formal education.

Their fathers, on the average, had

It was interesting to find that better than

sixty percent of those currently working in textile factories came from
families whose primary income recipient was also employed in the textile
Mills in Manchester.

^Doeringer.

p.43.
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Concluding Comments
In this section, I will synthesize the occupational and labor market
information gathered in the interviews with the dual labor market theory.
As we shall see, this raises several important problems, as there was no
clear-cut, one-to-one correspondence between the characteristics of employ
ment in any one firm and the basic postulates of dual theory.

Dual

theorists argue that employment conditions in secondary labor markets are
characterized by high turnover, low pay, almost no opportunity for in-firm
occupational advancement, arbitrary managerial control and a general
environment which is unconducive to the formation of stable employment
relationships.

A corollary to these characteristics is that industries

where these work relationships predominate are low wage industries, i.e.,
denoted by low profit margins and situated in competitive product and
factor markets.

Primary market jobs pay higher wages, are more stable

(lower turnover), oftentimes are unionized, and are characterized by the
presence of an internal labor market.

Employers are generally more

restrictive in their hiring policies and usually provide for specific
training for workers.
Table 7 presents a summary of the employment conditions in each of
the three industrial sectors:

Footwear, Electronics and Textiles.

It

appears that in some industries, despite unstructured and informal recruit
ment procedures, relatively short training programs, and high turnover,
a well-developed internal labor market operates.
in the textile industry.

This was especially true

Prerequisites for employment were minimal, entry

training programs lasted only about two weeks and turnover among young
workers was said to be very high.

However, the textile industry provided

the clearest examples of an internal labor market structure.

Workers who

T A BLE 7

Summary of Case Study Findings
FOOTWEAR

ELECTRONICS

TEXTILE

Hiring

Walk-Ins, Word of mouth,
Local media

Newspaper ads
Employment offices

Referrals, Local media
Mill closings in N.E.

Screening

No standard requirements
for employment

References checked
Appeared Preference for
High school graduates

No prescribed require
ments, Pre-employment
physicals

Recruitment

Training

No formal training programs
Informal O.J.T., watching
were said to exist, Learn
someone, More formal
by watching someone perform demonstration classes,
ing the job
Vestibule and company
training schools

Entry level, formal,
supervised training
period, Beyond O.J.T.
more informal, watching
experienced workers

Degree of Market
Internalization

No formal job ladders,
Upper level slots filled
by going to external
labor markets

In production lines,
upper level slots were
filled from within
when possible

Internal labor markets
well developed and func
tion to allocate the
internal division of
labor, Clearly defined
avenues of mobility
(pay increases and pro
motion) exist

Very high,
Mostly quits

High in some cases, low
in others, but not said
to be a serious problem,
Workers usually move to
another electronics
company

High, among young
workers
Mostly quits

Turnover

v

o

In
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stayed with the company had definite lines of upward progression open to
them, i.e., pay increases and promotions.

I would, therefore, tend to

consider textile workers to be in the primary labor market.

They were,

to be sure, very low level primary workers, in that the jobs were routine,
workers did not possess a great deal of autonomy over their jobs, and
turnover resulted more in going to another similarly situated firm rather
than advancement.
In the electronics firms, recruitment was somewhat more structured,
upper level vacancies were filled from within and training programs were
both formal and informal.

Although specific wage information was not

available, given that electronics is a rapid growth sector, one can sur
mise that electronics workers, on the average, were better paid than either
footwear or textile workers.

The information presented herein, as well

as my personal observations of the plants visited, leads me to conclude
that occupations in the electronics industry belong in the primary labor
market.

Furthermore, workers who leave one electronics firm often go to

another electronics company, but textile workers who quit may either move
to a footwear company or stay within the textile industry.
true for footwear workers.

The same holds

This suggests there may be a separate labor

market for electronics workers, but a common labor market for shoe and
textile workers in the Manchester area.
Analysis of the footwear industry entailed a problem not encountered
in either of the other case studies.

The information gathered during the

interviews and the summary given in Chart 1 strongly suggest that jobs in
the footwear industry should be considered secondary market employment.
Recruitment procedures were quite unstructured, there were no formal training
programs, no evidence of internal labor markets, and very high turnover rates.
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All of these are clearly secondary market employment conditions.
one company that I visited was unionized.

However,

Although the presence of a

union is usually considered to be a characteristic of primary market
employment, in this case it was difficult to see whether or not the union
resulted in more stable employment.

In my judgment, employment conditions,

in terms of attractiveness of the plant and workers' sense of job attachment,
were somewhat better in the unionized than non-unionized plant. The latter
clearly belonged in the secondary labor market.

I am in no position to

argue the union was responsible for the marginally better conditions.
Regardless, occupations in the unionized firm can be considered very low
level primary, on a par with the textile workers'.
The basic problem involved in trying to fit the results of the case
study into the dualist perspective was in reconciling a conceptual frame
work for the study of labor markets with observed "real world" examples.
This problem was further exacerbated by the nature of the industries studied.
Textiles, footwear, and, to a lesser extent, electronics are all basically
low wage, competitive industries engaged in light manufacturing.

These are

obviously very different from the automobile or steel industries, which are
high wage and have a long history of collective bargaining and internal
organization.

No high wage industries or occupations which are unequivocally

primary were considered.

Thus, I was trying to see evidence of occupational

stratification within a narrowly defined segment of the labor market.
Clearly, some occupations exhibit both primary and secondary market
characteristics.

Jobs in the textile company were denoted by a developed

internal labor market and the presence of a union, but were marked by a
very high turnover rate.

Footwear workers in a nonunionized plant were,

according to established criteria, in the secondary sector while employees
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in a unionized shop were borderline primary.

Employees and jobs in the

electronics firms visited exhibited the most primary market characteristics
of the three.
In my judgement, there was a qualitative difference in employment con
ditions in the electronics companies as compared with the nonunionized
shoe company.

However, the others were marked by considerable overlap.

The important question is whether or not finding a "mixed bag" of primary
and secondary employment conditions in some of the firms is inconsistent
with the basic postulates of dual labor market theory.

In the remainder

of this chpater, I argue that this finding is not inconsistent with dual
labor market theory.
Even from the outset, it was unrealistic to expect to find an exact
one-to-one correspondence between the conceptual literature on the
characteristics of primary and secondary market employment and "real world"
situations.

It was far more important to see if employment patterns in the

industries studied conform to predictions of dual market theory.
The modes of employment which I have deemed secondary conform to the
theory, in that hiring standards were informal and casual with minimal
pre-employment questioning and screening.

The employer's chief concern

appeared to be simply getting enough people to show up for work.

Training

programs were unstructured, in that a new worker could be taught his/her
job in a very short period of time.

Advancement opportunities were limited.

For the most part, employees remained in their initial employment assign
ments, indicating the absence of an internal labor market.
were very high.

Turnover rates

Workers appeared not to have much difficulty in moving

about from one shoe or mill company to almost any other.
The above are all basic features of secondary market employment,
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which were found to characterize working conditions in the nonunionized
footwear company studied.
Occupations which I have deemed primary were characterized somewhat
by greater formality in the hiring process.

References were often checked,

and educational level was at least noted by prospective employers.

For

malized training rpograms, including vestibule schools, courses in assembly
related skills, and O.J.T. were found to be operative.

Many workers with

whom I talked had advanced out of entry level positions and were moving up
in an internal labor market.

Although turnover rates fluctuated, management

did not voice much concern about it being a serious problem.
The preceding are all established criteria for an employment situation
to be considered in the primary labor market.

They were also found to

characterize employment in the Manchester electronics industry.

As mentioned

above, jobs in some of the firms exhibited aspects of both the primary and
secondary labor markets, and as a result did not fall directly into either.
In the following paragraphs, I offer an explanation as to why there was
considerable overlap.
Compared with other cities where research on labor market structure
has been attempted, Manchester is considerably smaller in size and located
in a more rural environment.

Even though, in recent years, more industry

has been locating in New Hampshire (electronics, computer circuitry, etc.)
industry in Manchester has a long history of being dominated by the shoe
and textile mills.

Now in their declining stages, these industries, up

until very recently, accounted for a substantial amount of total manufac
turing employment in Manchester (see Table 6).
The domination of the mill work industries offers a partial explanation
for the lack of an historical process of the segmentation of the Manchester
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labor market.

It is quite difficult to see segmentation in a labor market

that is not characterized by a diverse industrial and occupational struc
ture.

However, the recent influx of electronics firms appears to have

contributed to segmentation of the Manchester labor market, since the mill
and electronics companies did not seem to draw manpower from the same pool
of workers.
Another reason for the difficulty in identifying secondary and primary
labor markets may have been the absence of non-white workers.
workers I interviewed were white.
any blacks in the plants I visited.

All of the

In fact, I really cannot recall seeing
Since dual labor market theory had

its origins in explaining the plight of urban blacks segregated into ghetto
labor markets, the study of a labor market without a sizable black popula
tion confined to low wage jobs makes for a severe test of the dual labor
hypothesis.
To summarize, I conclude that although the interviews suggest segmen
tation in the Manchester labor market, it is by no means as clear as in the
case of a large city where segments of the population are confined to cer
tain types of jobs in inner city labor markets.

Nevertheless, the employ

ment patterns in the firms studies were not inconsistent with dual labor
market theory.

The line separating lower level primary from secondary was

found to be a fine one, but when dealing with an emerging stratified
labor process, it would have been impractical to expect clear-cut market
segments, each with their own market specific characteristics.
In the concluding chapter, I present a review of the more important
findings derived from the empirical models and the case study.

I also tie

the two together, in order to show the extent to which the results of the
case study substantiate those of the econometric models.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapters, the incidence of segmentation in New
England labor markets has been examined by means of empirical models
and a case study.

The empirical sections included three econometric

models, using data from the 1970 Census Public Use Sample in an attempt
to identify factors which influence the process of wage determination in
primary and secondary labor markets, the likelihood of employment in the
primary market, and the chances for upward mobility.

The case study

entailed an indepth look at employment conditions and industrial organi
zation in three of Manchester, New Hampshire's largest manufacturing
industries.

In this final chapter, I present a summary of my major

findings, weaving together the results of the empirical models and the
case study.

The chapter concludes with some notes for further research

on segmented labor markets.
Major Findings
Education did not appear to be a significant factor in the alloca
tion of jobs in low wage, secondary labor markets.

The results of

Model 1 indicate that graduation status had no systematic effect on
earnings for secondary market workers.

Secondary employers thus displayed

no preference for high school graduates in their hiring and remuneration
schemas.

This was expected, given the low skill level of most secondary

employment situations.
This result was substantiated in the Manchester case study.

None of

the low wage industries surveyed had any education prerequisites for
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employment.

For example, although most of the footwear workers did not

finish high school, those that did worked at the same type of job as
those without the diploma.

Educational levels were said not to influence

productivity, and therefore had no impact on wages and earnings.

This

finding is similar to the results of two case studies of low wage Southern
textile plants wherein "the education of high producers did not differ
from that of low producers" and productivity and education were, in some
cases, inversely related.'*'
In the primary labor market, earnings and education were positively
related and completion of high school significantly increased a worker's
chances of securing a primary market occupation.

The coefficients of the

earnings and probability of primary employment models indicated that the
better paying jobs within the primary market are reserved for high school
graduates, and that the "diploma effect" remains a strong entrance require
ment to many primary market positions.

In the Manchester electronics

industry, the highest wage industry of those studied, employers seemed to
prefer high school graduates, although they said they did not screen out
nongraduates.

Their preference for graduates was clearly demonstrated, in

that all of those who exhibited upward mobility, i.e., moved out of entry
level positions, were at least high school graduates.

Thus promotion and

pay increases were dependent upon educational levels.
Even though more research is needed on the relationship between
education and income in different strata of the labor market, the results
presented here suggest that education "pays off" only in the primary
labor market.

Increasing educational levels of workers confined to secon

dary labor markets will not necessarily lead to higher incomes.

"*Tvar Berg, Education and Jobs:
Beacon Press, 1971), pp.87-88.

Accordingly,

The Great Training Robbery (Boston:

the "supply" approach to alleviating inequalities in the labor market by
increasing the human capital of disadvantaged workers is called into
question.

However, for workers who gain access to the primary labor

market, education serves its traditional function as a means of genera
ting higher incomes and promotional opportunities.
Years in the labor force exerted a positive effect on earnings in
the primary labor market, but were not correlated with earnings in the
secondary sector.

Furthermore, the longer a person resided in the

secondary market, the less likely were his chances of moving into the
primary sector.

The empirical results suggest that occupational stability

is encouraged in primary jobs, in that financial returns accrue to workers
who remain in and move up the ranks of an internal labor market.

The

internal labor market found to be operative in a Manchester textile com
pany had clearly defined mechanisms governing pay increases attributable
to promotions and seniority.

In general, those workers employed in firms

having internal market structures received pay increases and/or promotions
as specified in union contracts or in institutionally determined procedues.

The internal market clearly appeared to promote organizational

stability by providing employees (and management) with some degree of
protection from external market forces.
The finding that experience did not lead to higher incomes in secon
dary jobs can be attributed to the nature of employment therein.

The jobs

have short learning curves and productivity quickly reaches a plateau.
Dualists further argue that employment relations are casual, and there is
little incentive on the part of either management or labor to develop a
stable work environment.
contentions.

The case study only partly substantiated these

The jobs which I considered secondary were ones which

required minimal skill levels.

Turnover in the firms in which they were
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located was in excess of 100 percent.

Nonetheless, even in the firms

without a developed internal labor market, workers with seniority received
higher wages than new employees, even if they were performing the same
basic tasks.
With respect to the model testing the probability of upward mobility,
only participation in a vocational training program was found to increase
the likelihood of movement from the secondary to primary labor market.
This was the only human capital variable which proved significant in
explaining mobility.

Neither education nor experience increased a worker's

chances of upward mobility.
That the model failed to account for the extent of intersectoral
mobility over this time period was apparent, upon inspection of the data
which revealed a substantial number of respondents whose 1965 occupation
was in the secondary sector, but whose 1970 occupation was in the primary
market.

Despite the fact that this was a period of rapid G.N.P. growth

and falling rates of unemployment (tightening labor markets), the extent
of the mobility suggests that barriers between labor markets are not
impenetrable.

Similar conclusions were reached by Andrisani

2

and Rosenberg

who both concluded that secondary to primary mobility occurs to an extent
irreconcilable with a strict interpretation of dual labor market theory.
Although many dualists have been quite skeptical of expansionary
macro policy as a means to curb high levels of unemployment in the secon
dary labor market, the results obtained here suggest high levels of aggre
gate demand do have an impact on secondary to primary mobility, and on

2

Paul James Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor
Market Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.86.
3
Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Con
sequences" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1975), p.170.

3
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lowering unemployment rates.

More research is definitely needed on the

responsiveness of employment in low wage sectors of the economy to
fluctuations in aggregate demand.

However, I feel safe to conclude that

sustained high levels of aggregate demand are at least a prerequisite
to significant policy proposals aimed at the transformation of secondary
labor markets.
The results of the case study indicate there is a considerable
amount of intergenerational transmission of low wage labor power in the
Manchester area.

Many of the interviewees in the shoe and textile com

panies told me that their fathers also worked in the mills in Manchester.
Although the offspring may have marginally higher levels of education than
their parents, there did not appear to be any important returns to
increased education, in terms of movement out of these low wage industrial
sectors.

Perhaps this suggests the need for at least a high school

diploma in order to gain access to better paying employment.

One should

not be too quick to cite this reproduction of low wage labor power as
evidence supportive of the culture of poverty thesis discussed in Chapter
2.

I tend to consider it endemic to the structure of industry in Manchester,

a city with a long history of being a "mill town".

Nevertheless, further

research is needed on the life cycle experience of workers trapped in
secondary labor markets.
What overall conclusions can be drawn from the above findings?
While I feel that my results point to segmentation in New England
labor markets, the extent of secondary to primary mobility leads me to
stand in basic agreement with Doeringer and Piore's conclusion that:
The data currently available do not uniquely
support either a continuous (queue) or a dichotomous (dual) theory of the labor market. Never
theless it would seem that a unified labor market
with linkages between primary and secondary
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employment is most likely to characterize the
labor market behavior of the disadvantaged who
are white.^
Notes for Further Research
Substantive Issues
The results of the models and the case study clearly point to
areas where additional research is warranted.

In this concluding section,

I point out several of these areas and make suggestions concerning the
nature of this research.
1. Additional research is needed on the responsiveness of
employment in low wage sectors of the economy to fluctuations in aggregate
demand.

The Census data only provided employment information during an

expansionary phase of the business cycle.

Therefore, it was not possible

to determine whether or not those workers who were upwardly mobile during
the upswing found themselves either unemployed or back in the secondary
market once the downswing of the early to mid 1970's set in.

A possible

research strategy might entail extensive interviews with older workers
in low wage employment situations who have experienced numerous oscillations
in aggregate demand.
2. The results of the case study indicate the need for further
research on the life cycle experience of low wage laborers.

Many of the

workers I interviewed had been with the same company upwards of twenty
years, yet turnover in these firms was reported to be in excess of 100
percent per year.

Different employment patterns among different age

cohorts even within the same industry should be explored, especially since
proponents of dual theory advocate policies aimed at stabilizing secondary
market employment relationships.
4
Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and
Manpower Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971), p.183.
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3. The role and influence of labor unions in low wage firms and
industries is an area in which surprisingly little research has been
attempted.

Although union influence is not as strong in competitive

industries as in oligopolies, it is important to document the extent to
which a union is able to qualitatively improve the work environment in a
low wage, competitive firm.

It is important to shed some light on this

issue in that if the presence of a union stabilizes and institutionalizes
labor management relationships, unionization may become a means whereby
secondary market jobs can begin to take on primary market characteristics.
4. Additional research should also be focused upon the labor
market in rural and semi-urban geographic locales in order to test the
generality of dual theory.

The results of the Manchester study indicate

that a diverse occupational and industrial structure is a necessary pre
requisite to segmentation of a local labor market.

Supplemental studies

of the historical process of industrial development in small to mid
sized cities would do much to augment our understanding of the workings
of labor markets and market segmentation.
Methodological Issue
The empirical models contained herein, as well as in other
related studies, provide researchers with useful information on labor
market behavior.

Accusations of truncation aside, it is obviously impor

tant to find that education, vocational training, experience, etc. are
not correlated with earnings in the secondary labor market.

Likewise,

the Census data provide information enabling us to construct models
to examine the importance of labor market status five years earlier as a
determinant of current labor market status and, in general, to test the
significance that human capital variables have on labor market standing.
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I believe there is an important methodological problem with these
types of models that persons working from a dualist perspective need to
address.

The problem lies in my belief that these models are more geared

to exposing weaknesses in the traditional queue theory approach to the
study of labor market behavior than in demonstrating the viability of the
dualist approach.

The reason for this one-sidedness rests, in part, with

the nature of the data sources currently at our disposal.

Most large

scale government or government-sponsored surveys collect data on what may
properly be considered supply side variables:

education levels, partici

pation in vocational training programs, marital status, head of household,
etc.

What is missing are detailed characteristics of employment condi

tions and industrial structure, i.e., demand side factors to go along with
the supply side variables currently b,eing tabulated.
As shown in the previous chapter, in trying to determine if a parti
cular job is primary or secondary, it is important to know characteristics
of the firm as well as the industry in which the job is located.

In the

footwear industry, for example, the presence of a union in one firm was
a reason why employment therein was considered primary, while a nonunion
firm was clearly secondary.

Furthermore, occupations in firms which are

subsidiaries of larger companies or larger than their competitors may be
primary, while the same occupation in a smaller independent organization
may be secondary.

Thus, the size and relative autonomy of firms in an

industry are important factors in determining the labor market status of
employment therein.

This is especially true in light of the work of

Katherine Stone, which points out that the extent of market internaliza
tion

(the most important factor in determining primary/secondary status)

is directly related to the size of the organization.^
"’Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry"
in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et.al.(Lexington, Mass
D. C. Heath and Company, 1975), pp.27-84.

119

The above is not meant to deny either the importance or the viability
of econometric models presented by proponents of dual labor market theory.
It is quite legitimate to expose weaknesses in the mainstream paradigm in
order to signify the need for alternative approaches.

However, it is my

feeling that labor market segmentation theorists planning empirical studies
should place less emphasis on data bases constructed primarily for neo
classical analysis.

The case study is one approach which is particularly

constructive for generating data for the study of local labor markets.
The interview format developed in this dissertation enables the researcher
to have direct contact with workers for supply side and background data,
and with management for industrial organization and labor demand information.
I conclude that both are essential for a thorough study of the labor pro
cess, and believe that this dissertation provides an important contribution
to the development of a framework for labor market analysis which incor
porates demand side as well as cu^ply side factors.

It is my hope that

this study encourages other dualists to work on the construction of a data
base comprehensive enough to take account of individual and institutional
compenents of the labor market.

APPENDIX 1

Mean, Standard Deviation and
Correlation Matrices for Segmentation Models
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TABLE 8

Earnings. Model, Primary

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Earn

102.6031

62.9880

Exper

20.9973

9.9678

Wks

49.1398

5.9140

VocT

0.3829

0.4863

HSG

0.6785

0.4672

Class

0.8526

0.3547

Correlation Matrix
Exp

Wks

VocT

HSG

Exp

1.000

Wks

0.052

1.000

VocT

-0.009

0.062

1.000

HSG

-0.363

0.045

0.134

1.000

0.047

-0.004

0.002

-0.097

Class

Class

1.000
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TABLE 9

Earnings Model, Secondary
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Earn

64.3778

37.0705

Exp

24.7556

10.6344

Wks

47.4472

7.6355

VocT

0.1883

0.3880

HSG

0.3883

0.4876

Class

0.8500

0.3581

Correlation Matrix
Exp

Wks

VocT

HSG

Exp

1.000

Wks

0.062

1.000

VocT

-0.009

0.062

1.000

HSG

-0.363

0.045

0.134

1.000

0.047

-0.004

0.002

-0.097

Class

Class

1.000

TABLE 10
Probability of Primary Employment
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

° c c u p 70

0.8947

0.3071

Occupgg

0.8915

0.3111

VocT

0.3668

0.4821

Marital

0.9810

0.1367

Class

0.8553

0.3519

HSG

0.6536

0.4760

El

0.1802

0.3845

E2

0.2944

0.4559

E3

0.2303

0.4212

Correlation Matrix
Occup?0

Occup,c

VocT

OJ

Marital

Class

HSG

El

E2

0ccup70
Occupg^

1.000

0.578

1.000

VocT

0.132

0.117

1.000

Marital

0.013

0.011

0.009

1.000

Class

0.006

0.007

0.005

0.114

1.000

HSG

0.189

0.183

0.147

0.025

-0.099

1.000

El

0.048

0.057

-0.021

-0.031

-0.037

0.265

1.000

E2

0.027

0.019

0.040

0.029

0.044

0.021

-0.303

1.000

E3

-0.102

-0.081

-0.054

0.021

0.002

0.292

-0.256

-0.353

E3

1.000
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TABLE 11

Upward Mobility Model
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Mobility

0.3860

0.4883

VocT

0.2047

0.4047

HSG

0.4035

0.4920

Mar

0.9765

0.1516

Class

0.8480

0.3601

El

0.1170

0.3223

E2

0.2690

0.447

E3

0.3275

0.4707

Correlation Matrix
VocT

HSG

El

E2

E3

Mar

Class

1.000
0.115

1.000

0.131

0.331

1.000

0.019

-0.069

-0.221

1.000

-0.076

-0.244

-0.254

-0.423

1.000

0.079

0.127

0.056

0.094

-0.057

1.000

-0.068

-0.116

0.002

0.073

-0.190

0.150

1.000

APPENDIX

2

Sample Copies of Questionnaires
Used in the Case Study
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MANCHESTER LABOR MARKET SURVEY
MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

ORGANIZATION:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:
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I.

Recruitment and Screening
1.

Where do most of your workers live?

2.

From what sources do you do most of your hiring?

3.

Who is your major competition for workers?

4.

What do you look for when you hire workers?
(Probe:

education, experience, age, sex....)

II. Training
1.

Are provisions made for in house worker training?

2.

Who is usually given responsibility for providing worker
training?

(Probe for degree of formality)

III. Worker Mobility
1.

Are most of your workers hired into entry level positions?

2.

Are there opportunities for workers who begin their employ
ment in entry level positions to move up through the ranks?

3.

What are some of the factors which determine which workers
receive promotions?

4.

Can you give me an example of a line of progression or job
ladder which operates in this organization?

5.

When vacancies occur in upper level job slots, are they
normally filled by upgrading or transferring workers from
within the organization?

5a. If not, how are they filled?
IV. Turnover
1.

Can you tell me the turnover rate in this organization?

2.

Do you feel labor turnover to be a serious problem?

3.

When you lose workers, where do they go?

MANCHESTER LABOR MARKET SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE

ORGANIZATION:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

NUMBER:
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1.

What Is your present position with this organization?

2.

Can you give me a brief description of your work related responsibilities

3.

How long have you been working as a (response to 1)?
________________________ yrs. ___________________________ mos.

4.

How long have you been employed with (name of organization)?
________________________ yrs. ___________________________ mos.
If 4 is different from 3, ask 5 and 6; otherwise skip to 7.

5.

What was your position with this organization when you were first
hired? _____________________________________________________

6.

What positions have you held between your initial placement and your
current position?

7.

Are youpresently a member of a laborunion?________ yes

no

Please specify union name:____________________________________
8.

Between the time you were first hired and now, have you received
periodic:

9.

(a) Pay Increases

yes

no

(b) Paid Vacation Time

yes

no

(c) Other Fringe Benefits

yes

no

Since you started working for (name of organization) have you
undertaken any formal or informal on the job training?
yes

no

_______ yes

no

yes

no

If yes, ask 9a and 9b, otherwise skip to 10.
9a. Please indicate the nature of this training?
9b. Has this training led to:pay increases
promotions

10. Five years from now do you see yourself still working for (name
of organization?

yes

no

In what capacity? ___________________________________________
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What do you foresee yourself doing?____________________________
11.

What were you doing prior to your initial employment with this
organization?

school__________________________________
military_
another job___________ specify___
other___________ specify________

12.

Are you currently holding down a second job?
yes i

no

What type of work is your second job?_________________
13. What aspects of your current job do you like the best?

14.

What aspects of your current job do you like the least?

15.

Which of the following would best describe the relationship between
you and yourcoworkers

and your immediate supervisor?
Constant supervision
Supervisor "checking" regularly(every

hour)

Left along most of the day
Other, specify __________________________
16.

What

doyoulike

about your current job compared withjobsyou've

had in the past?

better

pay

_________ better hours
_________ better working conditions
_________ closer to home
_________ other, specify_________________
17.

Suppose a new firm were to locate in this area and offer you a job
similar to the one you now have.
you to swith jobs?

What would it take to persuade

_____ more money, how much _____
better conditions, such as _________
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18. What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?
No High School
Some High School
Some College
College Graduate
19. After you finished schooldid you take any formal vocational
training courses?_______________________ ____ yes _____ no
If 19 yes, ask 20; if no skip to 21.
20.

What kind of training program did you take?

21.

What was your first regular job after you finished school (and
traning program)?

22.

Do you feel your current job requires the educational background
you have?

23. Are you married?

____ yes

no

____ yes

no

If 23 is yes, ask 24; if no skip to 25.
24. Does your wife, husbandwork?

____ yes

no

What type of work does he, she do? __________________________
25.

When you were growing up, say in your early teens, what kind of work
did your father do?

26.

How much formal schooling did your father have?
No High School
Some High School
High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate

27.

Did you grow up in the State of New Hampshire?
If no, ask:

yes

no

In what state (or part of the country) did you live

while you were growing up? ___________________________________
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